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Abstract
Investor sentiment and attention are often linked to the same non-economic events making it
difficult to understand why and how asset prices are affected. This thesis disentangles these
two potential drivers of market behaviour by studying how investors react to sports outcomes,
weather conditions and merger and acquisition announcements.
Firstly, a new dataset of medals for major participating countries and sponsor firms over
four Summer Olympic Games is analysed. Results show that although Olympic success does
not lead to abnormal stock returns, subsequent market activity is reduced substantially. In
the US, for example, trading volume (realised volatility) during Olympics is over 24% (46%)
lower than usual while gold medal awards lead to a further decrease over the next trading day.
These findings are in line with recent theories and evidence related to investor inattention but
cannot easily be explained on the basis of sentiment. Analysis of data from online search
volumes and surveys measuring investor sentiment, also suggest that the market impact of
the Olympics is linked to changes in attention. I demonstrate that the statistical regularities
can be exploited by simple volatility trading strategies in the US to produce significant risk
adjusted profits.
Secondly, I study the relationship between weather and stock market activity using a
new perspective that does not rely solely on investor mood. I argue that bad weather can
increase the productivity of investors by making them more focused on trading and less
concerned about other leisure activities. This allows me to explain the empirical finding
of higher trading activity on rainy days for a sample of 33 international stock markets. In
iv
line with previous literature, I confirm that particularly bad weather conditions which create
inconvenience to market participants, such as snow, have the opposite effect by reducing
productivity and trading volume. Finally, I find evidence that weather has a nonlinear effect
on market activity.
Thirdly, I explore if the market reaction to M&As in the US is governed by attention
or sentiment. I find that attention, as proxied by online abnormal search volume, decreases
significantly before announcements and then increases dramatically on the event date. The
high level of attention diminishes shortly after. I also investigate whether the abnormal search
volume surrounding the event date affects stock prices. The results suggest that the resolved
uncertainty before the announcement date is incorporated into price discovery shortly after
the announcement as the learning capacity of investors constrains the information processing
speed in a bid to adjust the investment decisions.
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my loving parents . . .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Since the seminal work of De Long et al. (1990), several papers argue that the behaviour of
some investors deviates from the norm of full rationality which underlies the standard model
of market efficiency. Whilst this literature takes several different directions (for a review see
Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Shiller, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2007), I concentrate here on
the work related to sentiment and attention. Although these two effects are treated separately,
I show how they are related and focus on their joint investigation. A brief overview of each
literature follows.
The interest in the role of sentiment, feelings, mood and emotions in business and finance
stems from the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Research in this area
builds on evidence from experimental psychology and economics and studies how investors
are affected in the evaluation of information, risk, gains and future prospects. Investor
sentiment is estimated in empirical studies using a variety of approaches (Baker and Wurgler,
2007). Direct measures involve posing questions to investors through surveys, such as those
undertaken by the American Association of Individual Investors, Investors Intelligence, etc.
General surveys of consumer confidence, such as the University of Michigan Consumer
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Sentiment Index, are also sometimes used as they are known to have a close relationship to
investor sentiment. Indirect proxies typically assume that sentiment is influenced through the
psychological mechanism of “mood misattribution” (Ross, 1977). Simply put, sports success
or sunny weather influence the mood of some investors and make them more optimistic. In
turn, this makes them more willing to enter into long positions, which leads to higher returns
in the short-run. The causal link between the actual events and the mood of investors is based
on evidence from psychology which demonstrates, for example, that certain events influence
the general mood in the population (Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010; Dawson et al., 2014).
As noted by Edmans et al. (2007), the two principal approaches for indirectly measuring
investor sentiment are based on continuous variables and a single event respectively. The
continuous variables used include: weather conditions (Saunders Jr, 1993; Hirshleifer and
Shumway, 2003; Symeonidis et al., 2010; Schmittmann et al., 2015), lunar cycles (Yuan et al.,
2006) and market variables (e.g., performance, types of trading, derivatives positions; see
Brown and Cliff, 2004). Event based studies use, for example, aviation disasters (Kaplanski
and Levy, 2010b); changes to and from daylight saving (Kamstra et al., 2003) and holidays
(Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2004). Finally, another proxy for sentiment that is popular
recently is based on the textual analysis of news (Tetlock, 2007; Loughran and McDonald,
2011; Ferris et al., 2013). Overall, the empirical evidence has shown that sentiment is
associated with stock returns in an asymmetric manner according to which poor mood has a
stronger effect (see, for example Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a). Beyond
the first moment, there is some controversy in the literature concerning the link between
investor sentiment and market volatility. A comprehensive study by Symeonidis, Daskalakis,
and Markellos (2010) demonstrates that good mood, as proxied by weather and environmental
variables, is associated with increased volatility.
The exploration of attention in finance also stems from studies in psychology which deal
with the limitations to rationality (Simon, 1957; Kahneman, 1973). Part of this literature
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concentrates on how limited attention influences judgements and memory and leads to
behavioural biases such as the halo effect, the illusion of truth and magical thinking (Yantis,
1998). Another strand emphasises more the nature of attention as a scarce resource and
studies how this is allocated in a positive or normative manner between all the different
decisions and activities that investors are facing (Veldkamp, 2011). The work of Sims
(2003) studies the limited attention of an economic agent as an information processing
constraint and its implications in dynamic consumption choice. The arguments for the
impact of attention in finance often draw from the vast “dual-task interference" literature in
psychology which shows convincingly that humans cannot effectively complete two or more
tasks simultaneously (Pashler, 1994). As Ehrmann and Jansen (2012) point out, attention may
be inversely related to the complexity (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), the quantity (Hirshleifer
and Shumway, 2003), the time horizon (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009) and non-saliency of the
available information (Huberman and Regev, 2001). Moreover, attention may differ across
time, countries and firms (Barber and Odean, 2008). Some of the empirical implications that
are attributed to attention include the post-earnings announcement drift, the accrual anomaly,
the profit anomaly (Hirshleifer et al., 2011), asset mispricing (Brown, 2014), and the reaction
to stale news (Gilbert et al., 2012). In terms of empirical measurement, investor attention is
proxied using variables such as distance to weekends (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009), holidays
(Jacobs and Weber, 2011), Google search volumes (Da et al., 2011), market maker activity
(Corwin and Coughenour, 2008) and saliency of events (Barber and Odean, 2008).
Although there is growing empirical evidence about the importance of attention, few
relevant theoretical frameworks exist. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) develop a model of the
response of stock prices to earnings announcements in which a proportion of investors is
assumed to be distracted. The share of inattentive inventors amplifies the delayed response
of prices to news about earnings. Peng and Xiong (2006) model a representative investor and
solve for her optimal attention allocation in the presence of overconfidence. In this model
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attention is assumed to be fixed and is shown to endogenously lead to category-learning
behaviour where investors tend to process more market rather than firm-related information.
An interesting aspect of this model is that it allows for inattention but also for sentiment
in the form of overconfidence. However, this overconfidence is assumed to affect only the
cognitive capacity to process information rather than mood. Andrei and Hasler (2015) study
the joint importance of endogenously determined investor attention and uncertainty and
show how these drive risk premia and volatility. Increased attention in their model means
that market-related news is informative and volatility increases while uncertainty is reduced.
Although variance and risk premia of stock returns increase quadratically with attention and
uncertainty, attention is a more powerful driver of volatility. Attention to news varies across
time according to changes in the state of the economy but is under the direct control of the
investor. Schmidt (2013) develops a model of rational attention according to which investors
allocate more weight to market news over firm specific news when attention is scarce. He
proxies attention scarcity on the basis of the intensity of sports-related search activity on
Google. When attention is distracted by sports events, trading volumes are smaller, while
volatility and synchronicity become higher. A novelty of the model against others in the
rational attention literature (e.g., Sims, 2003; Peng and Xiong, 2006; Kacperczyk et al., 2014)
is that attention can be allocated between leisure time, such as following sports, and, learning
news which allows obtaining more precise signals for investment decisions.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
This remainder of the thesis has three parts. The first part (Chapter 2) examines the relation-
ship between trading activity and sports performance at market and firm level. I concentrate
on the direct link between sports outcomes, attention and sentiment respectively. The next
part (Chapter 3) extends the research question proposed in Chapter 2 regarding the potentially
joint effect of attention and sentiment through weather. This study investigates a new channel
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through which investors are affected by weather, which is typically believed to be a driver for
investor sentiment. Finally, the last part (Chapter 4) reinforces the importance of attention in
response to financial signals at a firm level by focusing on the information demand before,
during and after mergers and acquisitions announcements. In particular, it explores the
informativeness of abnormal search volume in relation to abnormal announcement returns
of acquiring firms. The final part of the thesis provides a summary and conclusion of the
research along with limitations and recommendations for future studies. The appendices
provide additional test statistics and results to supplement the research output introduced in
the empirical analyses.

Chapter 2
Is there an Olympic gold medal rush in
the stock market?1
Oh enjoying the thrill of the chase is fine.
Craving the distraction of the game, I sympathize entirely.
But sentiment, sentiment is a chemical defect found in the losing side.
Sherlock Holmes, A Scandal in Belgravia (BBC, 2012)
2.1 Introduction
The central idea in this chapter is that major non-economic events, such as soccer matches,
holidays or good weather, cannot be used as an indirect proxy of sentiment, as they also
affect the attention of investors. Information and behavioural biases, such as those caused by
sentiment, are reflected in asset prices only to the extent that investors pay attention to market-
1I thank Chris Brooks, Laura Veldkamp, Zhi Da, Jeffrey Wurgler, David Hirshleifer, Timothy Loughran,
David-Jan Jansen, Daniel Andrei, George Kavetsos, John Ashton, Wolfgang Maennig, Alasdair Brown, Peter
Dawson, Robert Hudson, Marc Jones and Thomas Gilbert for their comments on this chapter. I am also grateful
for feedback from the participants of the Research in Behavioural Finance in Rotterdam, the 2014 Behavioural
Finance Working Group Conference in London, the Behavioural Models and Sentiment Analysis Applied
to Finance Conference in London and of research seminars at University of Edinburgh Business School and
Norwich Business School.
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related activities. In this sense, attention is a prerequisite for shifts in the mood of investors,
a necessary but not sufficient condition for financial impact. If investors are distracted by the
loss of the team they support, for example, the decline in their mood may not find its way into
the stock market. What I may observe, however, is a reduction in market activity. My research
sheds doubt on the unbiasness of non-economic events as proxies of investor behaviour and
justifies a deeper investigation of the joint importance of sentiment and attention.2 To this
end, I analyse a new dataset of medal results over four Summer Olympic Games for eight
major economies (US, UK, France, Australia, Netherlands, Germany, South Korea and
Japan) and five multinational sponsoring firms (Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Panasonic, Visa,
and Samsung). I ask if the stock market impact of the Games and gold medals is due to a
shift in the mood of investors or to a distraction of their attention. Results indicate that there
is no significant statistical association between medal performance and abnormal returns
over the next trading day. However, trading volumes and volatility are significantly lower
during Olympic Games and are further reduced as a function of the gold medals won over
the previous day. For example, for each gold medal won by the US, the trading volume in the
S&P 500 firms is almost 3% less on the following day. For Germany and South Korea, this
decrease is even higher at 6.7% and 7.3%, respectively. These statistical regularities can be
exploited through simple volatility trading strategies in the US which produce positive profits
in excess of those from a passive approach. My results are consistent with recent theories of
investor attention, but cannot be explained on the basis of investor sentiment. I also show
that Olympic Games have an impact on a more direct measure of investor attention based
on online search volumes, but not on direct survey-based measures of investor sentiment. I
2It is surprising that this possibility has not been entertained yet in the financial literature, although it is an
idea that has been popular since antiquity. For example, the phrase panem et circenses - bread and circuses,
the latter having the meaning of public games and other of mass spectacles - is popular since Roman times as
a figure of speech to describe how a major sports event can be used to appease a specific group of people by
diverting their attention. The idea is still very popular, as exemplified by Hunger Games, the popular trilogy by
Suzanne Collins which was recently turned into a movie.
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conclude that in the case of Olympic Games, it is investor attention rather than mood that is
driving the effect on the stock market.
My study follows De Long et al. (1990) and other researchers which argues that irrational
investors may also exist in the market that are influenced by psychological and behavioural
factors. I concentrate on two of these factors, investor sentiment and attention, for three
main reasons. First, although a considerable amount of research is devoted to showing the
significant empirical effects of these factors on financial markets, they are treated separately
in the literature (examples for sentiment include Saunders Jr, 1993; Barberis et al., 1998; for
attention see Barber and Odean, 2008; Peng and Xiong, 2006). Since attention and sentiment
may have a similar impact on investors, a joint investigation of their importance is justified.
For example, sentiment is often proxied on the basis of exogenous events, such as sports
outcomes, which are considered to have a significant impact on the mood of investors (see
Edmans et al., 2007). However, investor attention may also be significantly affected during
these events which raises concerns about their unbiasness as sentiment proxies. Although not
studied in this chapter, my results suggest more generally that the use of continuous variables
for capturing investor sentiment, such as temperature or cloudiness, potentially suffer from
the same problems. My research produces interesting new evidence about the validity of
competing hypotheses and theoretical models of investor sentiment and attention. This allows
us to better understand how economic agents operate within markets and if their motivation
is more behavioural or rational. Second, my study is one of the few in the literature which
examines the impact of sentiment and attention at both the market and firm level. In addition
to increasing the robustness of the results, this is important since it is possible that effects
are diluted at the aggregate level due to noise or heterogeneity between firms (Baker and
Wurgler, 2007). Finally, correctly measuring the effects of sentiment and attention has
practical implications for the design of superior event-driven investment strategies (Kaplanski
and Levy, 2010a).
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My previously unexplored dataset of Olympic Game medals offers advantages over
existing data drawn from other sports, such as soccer matches and the Super Bowl, used by
other studies. This is because the Olympic Games are more likely to affect significantly the
behaviour of investors since they constitute the most globalised and important sports event in
terms of national and corporate impact. This means that I can adopt different units of analysis
which include developed and developing participating countries along with multinational
sponsoring firms. For example, compared to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which is another
important sports event of comparable importance (Edmans et al., 2007; Ehrmann and Jansen,
2012), the 2012 Summer Olympics involved 204 countries (compared to 32 which qualified
in the FIFA), 26 sports (1, soccer), 219.4 million TV viewers in the US (94.5 million), $13.6
billion in organising costs ($3.6 billion), $5.6 billion worth of advertising ($36 million) and
$100 million for each of 11 partners worth of partner sponsorship deals (between $24 to $44
million for each one of 6 partners every year from 2007 to 2010) (data drawn from IOC and
FIFA websites and various newspaper articles). For the 2008 Olympics, it is estimated that
up to 4.7 billion viewers (or 70% of the world population) watched some part of the coverage
(Press release, Nielsen Media Research, 8 September 2008). In the US alone, the London
Olympics constitute the most-watched television event on NBC with an average of 31.1
million viewers and unprecedented traffic, consumption and engagement on digital platforms
(NBC Press Release, 14 August 2012). The economic, social and political importance of the
Olympics means that evidence about their effects on the stock market is highly relevant for
organisers, policy makers and advisors. My findings concerning the impact of the Olympics
on individual sponsor firms are particularly useful for managers in these firms but also for
investors and market makers.
Within the sentiment literature, this study is related to an influential study by Edmans et al.
(2007) that proposes sports results as an indirect investor mood proxy. The authors argue that
losses in international games of soccer, cricket, rugby and basketball induce a negative mood
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which in turn leads to lower returns in the stock market over the next day. In line with the
prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the effect of match results is asymmetric
since wins are found not to affect returns. Further evidence of the economic significance
of these results is presented by Kaplanski and Levy (2010a). At the firm level, Chang et al.
(2012) show that National Football League (NFL) game losses lead to lower next-day returns
for locally headquartered NASDAQ firms. The importance of sports sentiment for the stock
market is also analysed in Super Bowl (US) by Krueger and Kennedy (1990), in soccer (UK)
by Ashton et al. (2003), in horse-racing (Australia) by Worthington (2007), in rugby by
Boyle and Walter (2003) and in cricket (India) by Mishra and Smyth (2010). Finally, Bernile
and Lyandres (2011) and Palomino et al. (2009), show that investor sentiment is important
for stock prices of publicly traded soccer clubs.
Within the attention literature, my study is related to Ehrmann and Jansen (2012) and
Schmidt (2013) who use sports events to capture inattention amongst investors. Ehrmann and
Jansen (2012) analyse high frequency data to show that market level trading volumes and
co-movements with global stock returns are reduced during soccer matches and goals. In my
research, rather than looking at what happens during sports events, I focus on the subsequent
short term effect that these events have on stock market activity.
My study of data related to Olympic Games is not novel in the literature although my
perspective is original. The economic, social and political significance of the Olympic Games
has motivated researchers to examine their impact empirically for hosting countries (see
the review by Kavetsos and Szymanski 2010) and sponsoring firms (Farrell and Frame,
1997; Miyazaki and Morgan, 2001; Hanke and Kirchler, 2013) but the evidence has been
largely inconclusive. Several studies suggest that the Olympics may have “well-being”,
“feel-good” or “happiness” benefits stemming from attending events, volunteering, national
pride, etc. For example, Kavetsos and Szymanski (2010) use a variety of major sporting
events, including Olympics, to demonstrate significant feel-good effects in the short term
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for hosting countries. However, they also find that the association between national athletic
success and happiness is statistically insignificant in their sample (further support to these
results is given by Oxford Economics 2012). As emphasised by Kavetsos and Szymanski
(2010) and Dawson et al. (2014), exploring the impact of Olympic Games on happiness
is important since this is assumed as given by politicians and it is adopted as a primary
policy objective. For example, one of the two strategic priorities that the Blair Government
set out in the bidding for, and hosting, the London Olympics in 2012 was “a sustainable
improvement in success in international competition, particularly in the sports which matter
most to the public, primarily because of the ‘feel-good factor’ associated with winning”
(DCMS/ Strategy Unit, 2002, p.12). Outside the Olympics, Palomino et al. (2009) are one
of the few studies that examine sports sentiment and investor attention. They use a sample
of listed British soccer teams and study the variation in stock prices conditional to match
outcomes and betting odds. The evidence suggests that investor sentiment has an impact on
prices while the effect of attention is less clear. Drawing more general conclusions from
these results is limited by the sample used since it includes only 16 firms from one country
over three years. Moreover, these firms are all from the sports industry where shareholders
are likely to be also fans and are more prone to sentiment effects.
2.2 Hypothesis development
My hypotheses involve the effect of positive outcomes from major sports events on investor
sentiment, attention and stock market activity. These are motivated by the literature reviewed
in the previous section. First, I examine the direction of this effect on stock market activity,
as measured by trading volume and volatility, respectively. Sports success is proxied in my
study by the number of Olympic medals won by a particular country or sponsoring firm.
Hypothesis I. Sports success leads to a decrease in stock market activity.
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The existing literature on the effect of sports events does not examine this particular
hypothesis and focuses on interpretations that involve investor sentiment alone. I study the
strength and nature of this effect by considering the possibility of both investor sentiment
and attention. On the one hand, existing theories and evidence from an investor sentiment
perspective suggest that sports success should have a weak or insignificant positive effect on
stock market returns (see Edmans et al., 2007). However, it is not clear in the literature what
the effect of sentiment is on trading volume and volatility (see Symeonidis et al., 2010). On
the other hand, the literature on investor attention predicts a positive relationship between the
level of investor attention and market activity (eg., see Andrei and Hasler, 2015 for a relevant
theoretical justification; for relevant empirical evidence see Ehrmann and Jansen, 2012;
Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012). In my particular empirical setting, there is evidence which
implies that the general population and workers are significantly distracted. For example, in
August 2008, when Olympics took place, the time spent watching TV by all UK viewers was
3,898 minutes (2.09 hours per day), compared to 3,418 minutes (1.83 hours per day) in 2007
(Ofcom, 2012), an increase in viewership by 14%. The same report notes survey evidence
on the media intentions of UK consumers for the London 2012 Games which suggests that
around one in four people in full time employment reported a priori that they are likely to
watch or listen the events coverage at work (for evidence on other sports see also Lozano,
2011; Hagn and Maennig, 2008). In order to shed further light on the driving forces behind
the market activity effect of sports events, I also examine how sport success affects direct
measures of investor sentiment and attention, respectively:
Hypothesis II. Sports success has a positive effect on investor sentiment.
Hypothesis III. Sports success has a negative effect on investor attention.
In my study, I use the intensity of online search volumes for investment information
in order to directly approximate information. Sentiment is proxied using responses from
relevant surveys of market participants.
14 Is there an Olympic gold medal rush in the stock market?
2.3 Empirical analysis
2.3.1 Sample description
My sample covers four Summer Olympic Games (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012) and eight
countries: United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Netherlands,
Germany, Japan and South Korea (a full list of the variables and acronyms used in this study
is given in Table 2.1). These countries are Olympic “superpowers” and consistently rank at
the top positions in terms of the medal winning index over the sample period (a breakdown
of medals is given in Table A.1 in the Appendix). It is important to study several countries
since there is evidence that both sentiment (Jones et al., 2012) and attention (Ehrmann
and Jansen, 2012) may have different effects across cultures. The US leads in terms of
Olympic performance by winning 11.08% of total medals over the four games studied.
The performance of these countries is stable over time as indicated by the fact that their
total medal count proportion per year ranges between 34.76% and 43.05% (for the US it is
10.45%, 10.92%, 11.48% and 11.45% for 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 respectively). It is
known from previous research that Olympic success at the country level is linked to economic
performance (Bernard and Busse, 2004). So, it comes as no surprise that the countries in my
sample are significant economic powers with stock markets that have an important role in
the global environment. All countries, except for South Korea, can be clearly classified as
developed (e.g., see 2014 MSCI market classification). South Korea is usually classified as
an emerging market (e.g., in MSCI and Dow Jones Global Index), but sometimes appears
as a developed market (e.g., in the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market and S&P Global
BMI indices). My sample also includes five firms which have been major (also known as
worldwide) sponsors for the Summer Olympic Games throughout the period of study: Coca
Cola, Visa, McDonald’s, Panasonic and Samsung. The three first are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) while Panasonic and Samsung are listed on the Tokyo Stock
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Exchange and Korea Exchange, respectively. All firms are multinational corporations with a
global consumer and investment base and a combined capitalisation of over half a trillion
dollars on 1 August, 2012.
Table 2.1 Variable abbreviations and descriptions
Abbreviation Description
US, UK, FRA,
Country label for United States of America, United Kingdom, France,
Australia, Netherlands, Germany, South Korea, Japan
AUS, NLD, GER,
KOR, JPN
R
Stock market index logarithmic return (S&P 500:US, FTSE:UK,CAC:FRA,
ASX:AUS, AEX:NLD, DAX:GER, KOSPI:KOR, NIKKEI:JPN)
Games Dummy variable denoting the Olympic market period for each country
MSCI Morgan Stanley stock market index for global stock funds in local currency
RV Realised volatility estimate for each country
IV
Implied Volatility Index (VIX: US, VFTSE:UK, VCAC:FRA,
SPAVIX: AUS, VAEX: NLD, VDAX: GER, VKOSPI: KOR, VXJ: JPN)
Med Total Number of Medals
TMed Total Number of medals from eight Countries
Gold Number of Gold Medals
TGold Total Number of Gold medals from eight Countries
Silver Number of Silver Medals
TSilver Total Number of Silver medals from eight Countries
Bronze Number of Bronze Medals
TBronze Total Number of Bronze medals from Eight Countries
Popular Total Number of Medals from Popular Sports
TPopular Total Number of Medals from Popular sports from eight Countries
KO, MCD, PC,
Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Panasonic, Visa, Samsung
VIS, SAM
VLM Trading volume for each country in USD
SVI Search Volume Index
For each country in my sample, I hand collect from a variety of online sources data on
gold, silver and bronze medals won over the sample period.3 My sample includes all of the
3,729 medals across 35 different sports won by the eight countries studied between 2000 and
2012. In addition to the overall results, I also study a subsample of medals from the five most
popular sports according to the definition given by the International Olympic Committee
(IOC). This definition is based on the number of visits to the pages of the IOC website for
3Crosschecks where performed across several websites in order to ensure the validity of the results for the
Games of: 2000 (Pandora, Medaltally, CNN sports), 2004 (Yahoo sports, Telegraph), 2008 (Telegraph, BBC)
and 2012 ( London 2012 official website).
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different sports from January 2004 to 11 February 2005 (see IOC Report to the 117th IOC
Session from 24 May 2005).
Datastream is used to draw financial data. For each country I collect stock market
variables, daily stock prices and trading volumes, related to a major basket index: S&P500
(US), FTSE (UK), CAC (FRA), ASX (AUS), AEX (NLD), DAX (GER), KOSPI (KOR)
and NIKKEI (JPN). As in Edmans et al. (2007), I use total returns (assuming that dividends
are reinvested) in local currency since I am primarily interested in the impact for domestic
investors. The MSCI World Total Return (Net) Index is used to approximate the stock
market return at a global level. I also gather daily observations on the following implied
volatility indices: VIX (US), VFTSE (UK), VCAC (FRA), SPAVIX(AUS), VAEX(NLD),
VDAX(GER), VKOSPI (KOR), VXJ (JPN). Daily measures of realised volatility on a simple
5-minute estimator are drawn from the Oxford-Man Institute website. Stock price and volume
data for sponsor firms are collected for the five stocks under study.
Descriptive statistics of the logarithmic returns for the stock indices and firms under
study are presented in Table 2.2. A first observation is that the average return over the whole
sample (Mean) is lower than that over the period of the Olympic Games (Mean′) for all
countries and firms, except one (SAM). However, none of these differences are statistically
significant on the basis of a two-tailed t-test. This is a first indication that Olympic euphoria
is not transmitted to the stock market.
The most (least) volatile market in the sample is South Korea (Australia) with an annu-
alised daily standard deviation of 26.7% (16.9%). The descriptive statistics indicate clearly
that unconditional standard deviation is much lower over the Olympic period for all but
one country (South Korea) and three of the firms (KO, MCD and SAM). For example, the
standard deviation of S&P 500 daily returns is 18.3% lower during the Olympic Games. A
two-sided chi-squared test confirms that these differences are highly significant and not due
to sample error. A further investigation of the effect on stock market activity indicates that
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of stock index and sponsor firm returns
Variable Mean Mean′ St.Dev St.Dev′ Min Max
MSCI -1.09E-05 9.13E-04 0.0115 0.0094 -0.0733 0.0910
US -1.56E-05 1.46E-03 0.0136 0.0094 -0.0947 0.1096
UK -3.74E-05 1.12E-03 0.0131 0.0102 -0.0926 0.0938
FRA -2.08E-04 9.50E-04 0.0159 0.0136 -0.0947 0.1059
AUS 8.92E-05 6.06E-04 0.0107 0.0091 -0.0870 0.0563
NLD -2.30E-04 1.56E-03 0.0160 0.0100 -0.0959 0.1003
GER 1.84E-06 8.49E-04 0.0165 0.0119 -0.0743 0.1080
KOR 3.71E-04 9.53E-04 0.0168 0.0246 -0.1280 0.1128
JPN -1.94E-04 7.69E-05 0.0159 0.0121 -0.1211 0.1323
KO 2.42E-04 2.83E-03 0.0135 0.0174 -0.1060 0.1303
MCD 4.83E-04 3.82E-03 0.0156 0.0178 -0.1371 0.0898
PC -3.88E-04 4.38E-03 0.0211 0.0189 -0.2045 0.1739
VIS 9.80E-04 3.80E-03 0.0260 0.0174 -0.1467 0.2501
SAM 5.47E-04 2.57E-04 0.0246 0.0401 -0.1480 0.1398
Mean′ (St.Dev′) gives the average (standard deviation) of index returns during Olympic Games. The other
summary statistics are estimated over the complete sample.
unconditional measures of implied volatility, realised volatility and trading volume tend to be
significantly lower than average during the Olympic Games compared to the complete sample
(see Table A.2 in the Appendix). For instance, the average implied and historical volatility is
more than 30% lower for the countries studied. Average trading volume is over 20% (16%)
less for countries (firms). These results suggest that whilst returns seem to be unaffected
during Olympics, market activity is significantly less for all markets and all but one of the
sponsor firms (SAM). However, since market activity may be significantly influenced by
market conditions and calendar effects, a further investigation in a regression framework is
undertaken in the following section.
18 Is there an Olympic gold medal rush in the stock market?
2.3.2 Hypothesis I - The impact of Olympic medals on volatility and
trading volumes
I follow the two-stage event study approach of Edmans et al. (2007) in investigating the
effect of Olympic medals on returns, volatility and trading volume. In the first stage, I treat
the series under investigation (xi,t) in order to remove the effect of the market and calendar
regularities:
xi,t = αi+βi1Mt +βi2Mt−1+βi3Mt+1+βi4xi,t−1+βi5Januaryt +βi6Mondayt + εi,t (2.1)
Where xi,t is the series under investigation for country or firm i; Januaryt and Mondayt are
calendar dummy variables. When analysing country (firm) returns as the dependent variable
in regression (2.1), I include returns from the market portfolio proxy Mt (corresponding
MSCI national index) as an additional control variable. In the case of volume and volatility, I
only control for calendar effects using dummies for each month of the year. In the second
stage I regress the estimated residuals from (2.1) against gold medals won by each country
over the previous day:
εˆi,t = bi1Goldi,t−1+bi2Games+ui,t (2.2)
Where Goldi,t−1 is the number of gold medals won by country i over the previous trading
day. If gold medals are won when the market is closed, these medals are aggregated in
order to capture a compound effect on attention. I also include a dummy (Gamest) in order
to capture any systematic effects that may occur over the whole Olympic period. When
analysing sponsor firm returns, I use the number of medals at a national level (in the country
where the firm is listed) and the total number for the eight countries analysed. This allows us
to investigate effects at a local and global level. In addition to gold medals, I estimate the
regressions using silver, bronze and total medals (sum of gold, silver and bronze) along with
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medals won in the five most popular sports (including gold, silver, bronze and total medals).
Following Kaplanski and Levy (2010a), in addition to looking at the effect of medals for
each one of the eight countries and five firms, I also look at the collective effect that the total
number of medals for all countries has on the US stock market. These different ways of
measuring sports success and impact add robustness to my analysis and shed more light on
my hypotheses.
In line with the previous literature, I find that success in terms of Olympic medals is not
significantly related to stock returns at the market and sponsor firm level (results show in
Table A.3, Appendix). The nature of the sports I am studying and my dataset means that only
success can be directly measured for most sports. For example, for soccer, which involves two
teams it may be possible to identify a winner and loser during the final but for the marathon
the silver medal may not be considered a failure. Since betting odds data are not readily
available for Olympic Games, I attempt an analysis of the unexpected element in the medals
using the average number of medals per country for each sport over the sample period as an
estimate of the expected result. Specifically, I first calculate for each sport the likelihood (p1)
for each country of winning a medal as the percentage of medals the country won divided
by the total number of medals awarded. Then for each Olympic event, I calculate for each
sport the actual number of medals won by each country (p2). The difference between p1
and p2 gives a proxy for the surprise element. This will be positive (negative) if the country
wins a larger proportion of total medals than expected for each sport compared to what it
won overall over the complete sample of four Games. Rather than using the total number of
medals, this calculation can be done also on the basis of gold medals only. For example, in
Archery the US won in 2000 (over the four games) a total of two medals (three medals over
four games), none of which was gold. Therefore, the surprise is zero for gold medals. The
total number of medals in Archery is twelve for each Olympic game so the overall proportion
of medals won by the US over the sample of four Olympics is 6.25% ( 3÷ (4×12)). The
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actual proportion of medals won in 2000 is 16.67% ( 2÷12) so there is a positive surprise
for that event which is 10.42% (16.67%-6.25%) for total medals. This allows us to measure
positive and negative surprises and assess any asymmetry in the impact of sports performance.
I repeat the regression analysis using surprise-weighted medal results. The results once again
suggest that Olympic performance is not linked to stock returns (results shown in Table A.4,
Appendix). Conclusions are comparable even if I allow for an asymmetric effect of positive
and negative surprises in the test regression (2.2).
I turn next to the analysis of market activity for the countries and firms studied. The
results in Table 2.3 confirm my descriptive analysis and indicate an inverse relationship
between the number of gold medals and trading volume over the next day for all countries
and firms, except for Japan. In other words, the results confirm the effect of attention on
trading volume. In all cases, except UK, Australia, Japan, Coca Cola and Panasonic, the
relationship is statistically significant at the 10% level. Comparable results are obtained
for the alternative measures of success. As expected, gold medals appear to have a more
significant impact on volume compared to silver medals with the average coefficient b1 in
regression (2.2) being on average higher in magnitude for the countries studied (−0.0507 for
gold compared to −0.0454 and −0.0345 for silver and bronze, respectively).
Similar conclusions are reached from the analysis of realised and implied volatility
indices shown in Table 2.4. The relationship is correctly signed in all regressions but one
(Australia) and is statistically significant at the 10% level in most cases. Results are highly
significant for the US, Germany and Netherlands. The magnitude of the coefficient for each
individual country is small, implying a marginal effect. However, the collective impact of
all countries on the US stock market is significant and substantial in magnitude, with each
additional gold medal decreasing realised volatility by almost 20%. Comparable results
2.3 Empirical analysis 21
Table 2.3 The impact of Olympic medals on trading volumes
Market Gold Med Silver Bronze Popular
US -0.0295*** -0.0107** -0.0261** -0.0195 -0.0163**
(-3.2868) (-2.3947) (-2.0221) (-1.5511) (-2.0899)
UK -0.0213 -0.0125 -0.0399 -0.0392 -0.0206
(-1.2370) (-1.3052) (-1.1575) (-1.3203) (-0.8659)
FRA -0.0925** -0.0260** -0.0385 -0.0377 0.0248
(-2.3349) (-2.2352) (-1.2257) (-1.2743) (0.8487)
AUS -0.0116 -0.0145 -0.0552** -0.0098 0.0127
(-0.2269) (-0.8224) (-2.0808) (-0.2357) (0.7230)
NLD -0.1109*** -0.0445** -0.1081** 0.0283 0.0034
(-3.2309) (-2.2635) (-2.7234) (0.8392) (0.0569)
GER -0.0668** -0.0282*** -0.0506** -0.0792*** -0.0803**
(-2.4668) (-3.0729) (-1.9726) (-4.1994) (-2.1302)
KOR -0.0732** -0.0279** -0.0205 -0.0832** 0.0792**
(-2.2068) (-2.0196) (-0.7913) (-2.1555) (2.1852)
JPN 0.0006 -0.0133 -0.0241 -0.0353 -0.0279
(0.0187) (-0.8373) (-1.4652) (-1.1187) (-1.4280)
TUS -0.0088*** -0.0029*** -0.0083*** -0.0078** -0.0066**
(-2.9044) (-2.7868) (-2.7695) (-2.4863) (-2.3002)
KO -0.0263 -0.0059 -0.0072 -0.0062 -0.0103
(-1.6396) (-0.7676) (-0.3652) (-0.2664) (-0.8877)
MCD -0.0685*** -0.0243** -0.0522* -0.0543* -0.0296*
(-2.9348) (-2.2204) (-1.7193) (-1.7522) (-1.9214)
PC -0.0175 -0.0037 0.0084 -0.0233 -0.0090
(-0.4280) (-0.1919) (0.1850) (-0.3841) (-0.3112)
VIS -0.0321** -0.0137** -0.0398* -0.0245 -0.0228***
(-1.9561) (-2.0623) (-1.7351) (-1.1889) (-2.6573)
SAM -0.0940** -0.0177 0.0160 -0.0310 -0.0302
(-2.1648) (-1.3993) (0.4523) (-0.5591) (-0.3126)
Firm TGold TMed TSilver TBronze TPopular
KO -0.0059 -0.0018 -0.0052 -0.0043 -0.0047
(-1.0296) (-0.8668) (-0.8610) (-0.6930) (-0.8321)
MCD -0.0182** -0.0067*** -0.0198*** -0.0200** -0.0147**
(-2.3855) (-2.6167) (-2.8151) (-2.5096) (-2.1734)
PC -0.0057 -0.0021 -0.0073 -0.0055 -0.0024
(-0.4012) (-0.4795) (-0.6207) (-0.4190) (-0.1955)
VIS -0.0115** -0.0040** -0.0113* -0.0112** -0.0117**
(-2.1506) (-2.1526) (-1.9923) (-2.1589) (-2.1477)
SAM -0.0079*** -0.0025** -0.0060* -0.0078** -0.0086***
(-2.7386) (-2.4729) (-1.8609) (-2.3051) (-3.2735)
This table gives the value of the coefficients bi1 in regression (2.2) with trading volume as the dependent variable
in (2.1), respectively. Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. When TUS is used, it is the total number of medals for
all eight countries, the trading volume corresponds to the US. When analysing firms, the number of medals
and volume correspond to the market where the firm is listed. I also use the total number of medals for the
eight countries analysed in order to capture a more global effect of medals on firms which may result from
international exposure.
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(shown in Table 2.5) are obtained if historical volatility is analysed using a GJR GARCH(1,1)
model (Glosten et al., 1993):
σ2i,t = ωi+ϕi1µ
2
i,t−1+ϕi2σ
2
i,t−1+ϕi3µ
2
i,t−1Ii,t−1+δiMEDi,t (2.3)
where Ii,t−1 = 0 if µi,t−1 ≥ 0 and Ii,t−1 = 1 if µi,t−1 < 0
For all firms and countries studied, a negative relationship is found between gold medals
and historical volatility over the next day and it is statistically significant in most cases
(including US, UK, FRA, JPN, TUS and four of the companies studied).
The final step in the analysis is to examine if the statistical regularities uncovered are
economically significant. In line with the literature (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a), I investigate
the US since this is by far the largest market in my sample. Although results for returns
are statistically insignificant they are correctly signed (see Table A.3 in Appendix), which
motivates us to examine economic significance. VIX futures and S&P 500 futures contracts
are used as underlying assets for trading volatility and returns, respectively.4 For VIX futures
a cost of $1.2 is assumed per contract side (estimate from CBOE for April 2013). For the
S&P 500 futures the cost was assumed at $3.80 per round-trip transaction (estimate from
CME, effective February 26, 2014). Trading signals are constructed on the basis of medals
awarded since the previous working day. Four different medal results are considered: total
number of US gold medals, total number of US gold medals in popular sports, total number
of gold medals across all countries and total number of gold medals across all countries in
popular sports. The results of various active trading strategies against passive strategies for
the VIX and S&P500 are presented in Table 2.6. The number of contracts per trade was
determined on the basis of gold medals won over the previous day. So, if US won four gold
medals over one day, then according to the first strategy four VIX contracts are shorted. In
4VIX futures started to trade on 26 March 2004. In order to extend this series so that it covers complete
sample of four Olympic games, I used VIX spot data for the period between 15 September 2000 and 2 October
2000 as a proxy of the futures series.
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Table 2.4 The impact of Olympic medals on realised (RV) and implied (IV) volatility
Market Gold Med Silver Bronze Popular
RV
US -6.47E-06** -2.53E-06** -5.99E-06* -5.91E-06 -2.45E-06
(-2.1323) (-2.0395) (-1.7369) (-1.3332) (-1.2905)
UK -2.36E-06 -1.39E-06 -2.90E-06 -5.58E-06* -2.87E-06
(-0.7723) (-1.0375) (-0.7094) (-1.7421) (-0.4832)
FRA -6.25E-06 -2.40E-06 -8.91E-06 1.17E-06 -2.95E-06
(-1.4008) (-1.1503) (-1.6189) (0.1994) (-0.5169)
AUS 2.63E-05*** 6.79E-06*** 7.96E-06** 1.90E-05*** -2.00E-07
(9.6316) (4.9323) (2.3015) (4.2385) (-0.0471)
NLD -2.28E-05*** -1.28E-05** -2.49E-05** -5.21E-06 1.36E-05
(-2.5821) (-2.4951) (-2.4186) (-0.6886) (0.9854)
GER -2.81E-05*** -5.78E-06* -6.80E-06 -8.90E-06 -2.29E-05*
(-3.0275) (-1.8760) (-0.5948) (-0.8131) (-1.8108)
KOR -9.58E-06 -3.14E-06 3.85E-07 -1.09E-05** -1.13E-05
(-1.5441) (-1.1492) (0.0889) (-2.1591) (-0.9621)
JPN -5.54E-06 -1.75E-06 -4.84E-06* 1.70E-07 -6.68E-06*
(-1.6395) (-0.8195) (-1.9455) (0.0281) (-1.8929)
TUS -1.98E-06** -6.51E-07** -1.95E-06** -1.70E-06* -1.27E-06*
(-2.0685) (-2.1270) (-2.2833) (-1.8213) (-1.9168)
IV
US -8.91E-06*** -3.38E-06** -7.03E-06* -9.13E-06** -4.40E-06**
(-3.0842) (-2.4034) (-1.8103) (-2.1787) (-2.2181)
UK -8.36E-06* -4.61E-06** -1.36E-05** -1.42E-05** -3.82E-06
(-1.8607) (-2.0813) (-2.1143) (-2.1526) (-0.3880)
FRA -2.16E-05*** -7.69E-06*** -1.24E-05*** -1.41E-05* 2.23E-06
(-3.9424) (-3.3655) (-2.6772) (-1.6977) (0.3070)
AUS 1.51E-06 -3.39E-06 -9.14E-06 -8.92E-06 2.07E-05**
(0.1003) (-0.7430) (-1.1965) (-0.8987) (2.2783)
NLD -5.10E-05*** -2.74E-05*** -3.39E-05** -2.42E-05 -6.54E-06
(-2.8760) (-2.6227) (-2.1781) (-1.4977) (-0.5624)
GER -2.14E-05** -9.56E-06*** -1.96E-05** -2.52E-05*** -2.26E-05**
(-2.4126) (-3.0823) (-2.3725) (-3.9920) (-2.3239)
KOR -9.76E-06* -4.05E-06** -5.19E-06 -1.01E-05** -1.03E-05
(-1.8971) (-2.1672) (-1.0934) (-2.2775) (-0.8131)
JPN -7.46E-06 -8.24E-06*** -1.65E-05** -1.54E-05*** -1.41E-05***
(-1.1308) (-3.1641) (-2.4126) (-2.8441) (-3.5145)
TUS -2.79E-06*** -9.30E-07*** -2.53E-06** -2.74E-06*** -1.63E-06**
(-2.7072) (-2.6617) (-2.5109) (-2.6383) (-2.0250)
This table gives the value of the coefficients bi1 in regression (2.2) with realised and implied volatility as
the dependent variable in regression (2.1), respectively. Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West
(1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. When
TUS is used, which is the total number of medals for all eight countries, the realised and implied volatility
correspond to the US.
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Table 2.5 The impact of Olympic medals on historical volatility
Market Gold Total Silver Bronze Popular
US -1.70E-05*** -4.48E-07** -1.25E-06*** -1.58E-06*** -6.35E-07***
(-269.6852) (-2.3188) (-10.4413) (-9.1287) (-4.8870)
UK -2.30E-06*** -1.06E-05*** -3.69E-06*** -3.09E-06*** -4.91E-06***
(-26.3963) (-13.8386) (-10.8105) (-9.7972) (-13.1744)
FRA -7.47E-05*** -1.33E-06* -4.30E-05 -5.07E-05** -5.07E-06
(-13.9220) (-1.7493) (-1.0983) (-2.3294) (-1.5266)
AUS -2.40E-05 -3.90E-07 -1.30E-06*** -1.01E-06** -1.73E-06***
(-0.5358) (-1.5621) (-7.7394) (-2.2150) (-3.0274)
NLD -1.34E-06 -1.33E-06 -3.60E-06 -7.50E-06*** -2.91E-06
(-0.4772) (-1.486) (-1.4505) (-4.3284) (-0.9002)
GER -2.58E-06 -9.73E-07** -3.40E-06 -2.44E-06 -5.83E-06***
(-1.0510) (-2.0099) (-1.9150) (-1.5405) (-2.7802)
KOR -1.37E-06 -3.50E-05*** -2.57E-05 -5.90E-07 -1.48E-05
(-0.2689) (-3.1789) (-0.6330) (-0.0889) (-0.9604)
JPN -4.96E-06* -1.53E-06 -2.65E-06 -4.09E-06 -3.27E-06
(-1.7052) (-1.3138) (-0.6314) (-1.3425) (-1.2054)
TUS -5.90E-06*** -1.30E-07 -4.15E-06*** -3.98E-07* -3.30E-07
(-3.5149) (-1.5684) (-3.2830) (-1.7927) (-1.2111)
KO -2.12E-06*** -8.30E-07 -1.44E-06 -2.45E-06*** -1.29E-06***
(-7.4879) (-1.2252) (-0.8865) (-5.3442) (-3.7863)
MCD -2.23E-06*** -3.28E-06*** -2.00E-06** -2.60E-06** -5.46E-06***
(-7.0519) (-6.9751) (-1.9558) (-2.3589) (-2.9376)
PC -9.93E-05** -4.30E-05*** -3.70E-06 -5.97E-05*** -8.46E-05
(-2.5060) (-10.1986) (-0.3402) (-2.6036) (-1.3147)
VIS -6.51E-05*** -2.69E-06** -9.51E-06* -8.76E-06 -4.28E-06***
(-7.0712) (-2.0945) (-1.6587) (-1.4022) (-7.8150)
SAM 3.50E-06 -1.22E-08 -4.34E-06 3.14E-07 -7.52E-06
(0.2543) (-0.0023) (-0.3206) (0.0160) (-0.1626)
Firm TGold TMed TSilver TBronze TPopular
KO -7.40E-07 -2.43E-07 -7.22E-07 -6.40E-07 -5.52E-07
(-1.2302) (-1.4399) (-1.0816) (-0.9330) (-0.9381)
MCD -3.83E-06 -1.06E-06*** -3.56E-06*** -6.66E-07*** -7.00E-06***
(-1.5002) (-2.7367) (-9.4940) (-2.7669) (-5.6443)
PC 3.15E-08 1.32E-08 4.35E-08 4.20E-08 -6.47E-06***
(0.0381) (0.0552) (0.0526) (0.0508) (-17.9240)
VIS -2.37E-05*** -5.25E-06*** -2.30E-06** -2.46E-06*** -7.19E-06***
(-12.19923) (-36.06726) (-2.2985) (-2.9433) (-8.0901)
SAM 7.72E-09 -5.10E-09 -6.42E-08 1.18E-08 -9.12E-08
(0.0061) (-0.0133) (-0.0496) (0.0089) (-0.0880)
This table gives the value of the GJR GARCH (1,1) coefficients δi in model (2.3). Numbers in brackets
correspond to z-statistic values. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated
using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. When TUS is used, it is the total number of medals for all eight countries, the historical volatility
corresponds to the US. When analysing firms, the number of medals and historical volatility correspond to the
market where the firm is listed. I also use the total number of medals for the eight countries analysed in order
to capture a more global effect of medals on firms which may result from international exposure.
2.3 Empirical analysis 25
the case of the S&P 500 strategies, a long position in futures contracts is taken for each gold
medal won. All trading positions last only for one day. The results suggest that all volatility
trading strategies are highly profitable and superior to a passive approach. For example,
taking a short VIX contract for each US Gold medal won, leads to an average daily return
of 1.79% with a total of 156 contracts, 60.98% of which are profitable. Overall, the trading
strategies allow similar conclusions to those drawn on the basis of the statistical analysis.
So, the impact of medals on volatility is significant from both a statistical and economic
perspective. The same does not hold for the impact of medals on returns since they do not
lead to any significant profits.
Table 2.6 Economic significance of results: VIX and S&P 500 futures trading strategies
Strategy Daily Return Contracts Profitable Trades
VIX
US Gold Medals 1.79% 156 60.98%
US Popular Gold Medals 1.48% 106 60.98%
Total Gold Medals 4.28% 483 62.79%
Total Popular Gold Medals 1.96% 179 61.90%
Buy & Hold -0.09% 4 50.00%
Sell & Hold 0.09% 4 50.00%
S&P 500
US Gold Medals -0.36% 156 56.10%
US Popular Gold Medals -0.28% 106 56.10%
Total Gold Medals -1.56% 483 55.81%
Total Popular Gold Medals -0.46% 179 57.14%
Buy & Hold -0.01% 4 50.00%
Sell & Hold 0.01% 4 50.00%
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2.3.3 Hypothesis II and III - The impact of Olympic medals on investor
sentiment and attention
In this section I examine the association between the Olympic Games and alternative measures
of sentiment and attention. For sentiment I am limited by the availability of data and
analyse only the US using five different measures: the Michigan Consumer Sentiment
Index, the Wurgler sentiment index, the Dow Jones Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), the
IPSOS Global Primary Consumer Sentiment Index (PCSI) and the American Association
of Individual Investors Investor Sentiment Survey (AAII).5 The first four are recorded at
a monthly interval while the last is in weekly frequency. I perform my analysis over the
complete sample available and over subsamples in order to examine the stability of the
results.
I deseasonalise all indices using a regression against a monthly dummy in order to remove
any calendar regularities. I then create dummies for the Olympic periods which I regress
against the deseasonalised indices. The correspondence is not always perfect since Olympic
Games do not cover only one or a whole calendar month. I include a dummy for each month
if the Olympics cover at least two weeks over that month. In the case of the AAII sentiment
index, I regress it against the number of medals won, by the US and all countries, over the
same and the previous week. Results for the monthly indices and the weekly index are given
5The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is based on a monthly telephone survey of a minimum of 500
interviewees. It is based on the balance between favourable vs unfavourable responses on 50 core questions
concerning views on the financial situation of the interviewees and the economy in general (for a detailed
description see Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Schmeling, 2009). The Wurgler sentiment index is based
on six sentiment proxies which involve information with respect to closed-end fund discounts, equity share
turnover, first day returns on IPOs, IPO volumes, equity share in new issues and the dividend premium
(see Baker and Wurgler, 2007). The Dow Jones ESI indicator is based on the relative sentiment of text
references to the US economy on the basis of 15 major daily newspapers (see Vázsonyi, 2010). The IPSOS
index measures consumer sentiment is based on the composite response of consumers to 11 questions across
24 countries. The questions are about current and future economic conditions, intentions and expectations,
consumer confidence, job security and investments in the future (see http://im.thomsonreuters.com/
solutions/content/ipsos-primary-consumer-sentiment-index/). Finally, the AAII indicator measures
sentiment though a weekly survey of individual investors with respect to their bullish, bearish, or neutral on the
stock market over the next six months (see Brown and Cliff, 2004).
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in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, respectively. In all cases, the Olympics appear to have a positive
impact on monthly sentiment but this link is statistically insignificant. For the weekly index,
the effect of medals on sentiment tends to be negative over the same week and positive in the
week after the medals won but again no relationship is significant. In line with the literature,
these results suggest that the Olympic Games and successes do not lead to stronger bullish
sentiment amongst consumers and investors.
Table 2.7 Impact of Olympic Games on monthly sentiment indicators for US
Index Sample Coefficient
Michigan
1952-2012 1.6042
(0.4009)
1984-2012 -1.3057
(-0.2764)
2000-2012 1.7240
(0.2082)
Wurgler
1965-2010 0.1474
(0.5539)
1984-2010 0.2713
(1.1774)
2000-2010 0.3980
(1.4766)
ESI
1990-2012 0.3419
(0.0730)
PCSI
2002-2012 1.6052
(0.4299)
This table gives the value of the regression coefficients between various sentiment indicators and dummies
denoting months during which Olympics take place. Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987)
approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Finally, I investigate if the Olympic Games have an impact on investor attention for the
countries in my sample. I use a direct measure of attention, the Search Volume Index (SVI)
which is based on the intensity of queries on Google (see also Da et al., 2011; Vlastakis
and Markellos, 2012). Specifically, I investigate market-wide attention on the basis of SVIs
for queries related to different index names. For example, I use the SVI of “S&P 500" in
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Table 2.8 Impact of Olympic Games and performance on the weekly AAII sentiment for US
US Medt Goldt Silvert Bronzet Populart
-0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0096 0.0078 -0.0068
(-0.4860) (-0.3236) (-1.4471) (0.7201) (-1.3156)
Medt−1 Goldt−1 Silvert−1 Bronzet−1 Populart−1
0.0011 0.0031 0.0055 -0.0025 0.0035
(0.4763) (0.5023) (0.7311) (-0.4756) (0.9552)
Aggregate TMedt TGoldt TSilvert TBronzet TPopulart
-0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0014 -0.0023 -0.0050
(-0.9053) (-1.1321) (-0.5541) (-0.8110) (-1.3483)
TMedt−1 TGoldt−1 TSilvert−1 TBronzet−1 TPopulart−1
0.0005 0.0017 0.0013 0.0015 0.0022
(0.7621) (0.9411) (0.5752) (0.6878) (1.0762)
This table gives the value of the regression coefficients between sentiment and medals during the same week (t)
and the previous week (t-1), respectively. Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,*
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
order to measure the market attention for US. Raw SVIs are logarithmically transformed and
deseasonalised using dummies for each month of the year. I then examine the relationship
between investor attention and Olympic performance by regressing my SVIs on medals.
The results in Table 2.9 clearly suggest that the attention of investors inversely depends on
the number of medals won over the previous day for the stock markets under study. The
coefficients are correctly signed in all cases except for France, whereas the estimates are
statistically insignificant for France and Japan. Moreover, I obtain similar results if I use
number of medals from the same day rather than previous days (see Table A.5 in Appendix).
Overall, the results reject my second hypothesis and lend support to my third hypothesis.
Combined with the results and discussion in the previous section, the analysis suggests
that the significant impact of Olympic success on market activity is the result of investor
inattention rather than a shift in mood.
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Table 2.9 Impact of Olympic Medals over previous day on investor attention measured by
Google SVI
Market Gold Med Silver Bronze Popular Surprise
US -0.0652** -0.0275** -0.0585* -0.0963*** -0.0377*** -0.9420
(-2.4727) (-2.3706) (-1.8138) (-2.8875) (-2.7616) (-1.2810)
UK -0.1590*** -0.0788*** -0.1093** -0.2067*** -0.1913** -0.1847
(-5.1366) (-4.0962) (-2.5352) (-3.6956) (-2.2801) (-0.2157)
FRA -0.0415 0.0086 0.0595 0.0053 0.0236 -0.1781
(-0.1183) (0.0709) (0.3564) (0.0239) (0.1012) (-0.0572)
AUS -0.1122*** -0.0615*** -0.1190*** -0.1536*** -0.0708** 1.7402**
(-3.4351) (-3.3762) (-2.7703) (-3.4737) (-2.5638) (2.6691)
NLD -0.1023*** -0.0597** -0.0612 -0.1112** -0.1326*** 1.2210
(-2.6119) (-2.4549) (-1.4822) (-1.9838) (-2.8939) (0.7937)
GER -0.0530 -0.0292** -0.0531 -0.0782** -0.0390 -0.8908**
(-1.4282) (-1.9954) (-1.5174) (-2.0302) (-1.1295) (-2.5325)
JPN -0.0514 -0.0730 -0.2293* -0.1333 -0.0936 0.7331
(-0.4962) (-1.0739) (-1.8560) (-1.1939) (-0.8704) (0.3351)
Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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2.4 Conclusions
This chapter analyses two potential drivers of investment behaviour, sentiment and attention,
by investigating the Summer Olympic performance for eight participating countries and
five sponsoring firms. The results show that medals have a negative impact on trading
volumes and volatility which is statistically and economically significant. These findings
are in line with theories of attention but cannot be explained easily on the basis of sports
sentiment. Furthermore, I find a positive relationship between medals and a direct measure of
investor inattention for all sample countries. However, no significant link was found between
Olympics and investor sentiment on the basis of five different indicators. I conclude that
Olympic Games and medals affect the attention of investors but not their mood.
The recommendation of this chapter is that researchers should focus more on “attention”
when analysing “sentiment”. I study investor inattention and sentiment in the context of
sports events and performance. However, another empirical setting which is widely used
in the behavioural finance literature is related to the weather and environmental conditions.
It could be that the positive impact of sunny weather on returns is related also to investor
inattention rather than mood. This possibility is first discussed in Symeonidis et al. (2010)
as an alternative rational explanation for the negative impact of poor weather on volatility.
The literature suggests that the impact of weather on market activity is likely to be complex.
Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) report that in order to beat the rush, market participants tend
to leave early on rainy days which could have a negative effect on impact due to less time
devoted to work. However, Connolly (2008) show that workers tend to work longer hours
during rainy days (see also Hagn and Maennig, 2008). Loughran and Schultz (2004) show
that trading volume is lower during blizzards in a city due to travel and weather disruptions.
Zivin and Neidell (2014) show the effect of daily temperature shocks on the allocation of
time to labor as well as leisure activities. Lee et al. (2014) use arguments from cognitive
psychology along with field and lab data to show that bad weather increases productivity by
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eliminating potential cognitive distractions related to good weather. Hamermesh et al. (2008)
argue that daylight and time zones can induce temporal coordination of economic activities
and affect timing. More research is justified in order to better understand the interaction of
investor attention and sentiment in financial market.

Chapter 3
Do investors save trading for a rainy
day?1
3.1 Introduction
A voluminous literature has examined the effect of weather variables, such as sunshine,
cloudiness, rain and snow on financial markets (for more details see Saunders Jr, 1993;
Kamstra et al., 2009; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Saunders Jr, 1993; Goetzmann and
Zhu, 2005; Loughran and Schultz, 2004)). Most of the empirical studies report a positive
link between good weather and stock market returns. This is explained by using behavioural
finance arguments which in essence suggest that good weather creates a general positive
mood and optimism which in turn affects investment decisions. In the present study I seek
an additional possibility about the effect of weather on stock markets. This is motivated by
recent research in psychology by Lee et al. (2014) who show that precipitation has a positive
relation to productivity of individuals in three separate working environments. The focus is
on precipitation as this has been identified in the literature as the most important barrier to
1I thank Lazaros Symeonidis and Stephen Dorling for the comments on earlier version of the chapter. I
also thank the participants in the conference on Recent Development in Financial Econometrics and Empirical
Finance, and ICAEW Research Colloquium for their feedback.
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outdoor physical activities. The proxy of productivity and unit of analysis is trading activity
in major stock markets across 31 countries. In line with the previous literature on weather
and finance, I control for the possible effect of sentiment by using cloudiness as a mood
proxy. Motivated by Loughran and Schultz (2004), I control for the negative effect of snow
on trading activity which is associated with the inconvenience brought in urban environments
by this particular weather condition.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Weather, investor mood and stock return
One stream of behavioural finance literature investigates how the fluctuation of mood affects
stock market performances. To be more specific, this group of studies focus on if asset prices
are related to weather and environmental conditions, such as seasonal affective disorder
(SAD) (Kamstra et al., 2003), lunar cycles (Yuan et al., 2006; Kuo et al., 2010) and sunshine
(Saunders Jr, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). This line of literature is based on
empirical evidence in psychology which dictates that the weather affects mood (Keller et al.,
2005), and mood, in turn, can affect the judgement and quality of decision-making (negative
relation found by Au et al., 2003), and risk aversion (Kliger and Levy, 2003). In this context,
weather is considered as a proxy of mood acting on asset prices with upbeat mood linked to
more risk-tolerant behaviour with investors being more inclined to hold financial securities
(Bassi et al., 2013).
The relationship between weather and stock market returns has been the subject of an
increasing number of empirical studies but empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive. An
influential study by Saunders Jr (1993) finds that the returns on the NYSE are negatively
related to sky cloud cover in New York City with sunny days associated with a higher return.
The finding is further confirmed by Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) who examine the
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relationship between morning sunshine in 26 cities where the leading stock exchanges are
located. They conclude that the sunshine is strongly correlated with stock returns whereas
snow and rain are irrelevant to market returns. Comparing with findings on the significant
relationship between sunshine and stock returns, the evidence concerning the impact of other
weather variables on market performance is less clear. For example, Dowling and Lucey
(2005) investigate the impact of precipitation on the Irish stock market and conclude that
there is a negative but significant relationship between rain and stock returns. With regard to
the temperature, Cao and Wei (2005) investigate whether stock market returns are related to
temperature for nine international stock markets. They find that stock returns are negatively
related to temperature as investors are more risk-taking resulting from low temperatures.
Results are slightly weaker in summer than in the winter, and overall there is a statistically
significant negative relationship between temperature and market returns. A more recent
study by Chang et al. (2008) looks at the impact of weather on stock returns of NYSE and its
trading activity and the findings suggest that more cloud is associated with not only lower
returns but also higher volatility. On the other hand, they find temperature is irrelevant to
intraday stock returns.
Along this line of literature, an interesting paper by Schmittmann et al. (2015) finds
that good weather has a positive impact on investors mood, and subsequently investors are
more active in buying over selling behaviour. This finding supports sentiment literature
which suggests that good mood inversely affects investor risk aversion so that participants
are inclined to buy more. The paper also finds that retail investors trade more during days
with bad weather compared to days with good weather. The reason is that the opportunity
cost for spending time on trading when weather is good is higher.
Even though a certain relationship between weather and stock returns is supported by
large amount of empirical results, the way in which the market is affected by non-economic
factors remains unclear, especially when 82% of the trades take place electronically indoors
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nowadays. The argument that mood is the carrier bringing the weather effect into market
performance is questionable. If it is the mood mechanism that influences investment decisions,
why do different markets exhibit different levels of response (e.g., see individual regression
results from Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003)? These mixed results and unanswered questions
motivate my research to seek an alternative explanation of weather generated anomalies.
3.2.2 Weather, attention, trading Volume
Loughran and Schultz (2004) test the connection between the weather and investor behaviour
by focusing on localised trading activities. They find little evidence that local cloud conditions
affect trading volume or asset prices. However, they find that extremely bad weather and
religious holidays do reduce trading volume significantly. Their findings do not corroborate
earlier findings of a negative relationship between cloud cover and stock returns, but do
shift the focus from prices and return to trading activity. As the stock returns may not be
affected due to arbitrage, the variation of volume may give a more lucid picture of investment
decisions. However, Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) argue that the volume is an inaccurate
way of observing individual investor trading activities, because the volume at aggregate
level may not fully capture both the buy & sell side of activities. They use local trading
records for five major US cities to explore the relationship between liquidity and weather
for individual investors and again they find there is no significant difference in buy or sell
behaviour on cloudy days compared to the sunny days for individuals. As a result, they
propose an alternative interpretation of weather effect on NYSE spread. According to this
argument, the change of weather affects risk aversion of market-makers rather than individual
investors and this leads to a pattern of liquidity change on NYSE.
As the volatility is a direct measure to capture the investors attitude towards risk, Syme-
onidis et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between weather and market volatility in
order to further understand its implication for risk management. Considering a positive
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contemporaneous correlation between trading volume and volatility, the volatility should
behave similarly as trading volume in response to weather shocks. Unexpectedly, their
empirical results suggest that sky cloud cover is inversely related to various measures of
stock market volatility, whereas the prevailing sentiment literature claims that the bullish
shifts in sentiment are negatively correlated with market volatility Lee et al. (2002); Brown
(1999); Gervais and Odean (2001). These inconsistent empirical studies further motivate me
to investigate the trading activity in relation to weather by looking beyond the arguments
involving investor mood.
Summarizing the growing literature of weather effects on global stock markets, currently
there is no general agreement on how the stock market is affected by the influence of
weather. Some papers even doubt if a weather effect truly exists or simply it is a form of
data manipulation (see Jacobsen and Marquering, 2008; Kamstra et al., 2009; Jacobsen and
Marquering, 2009, for full details). However, the findings from the psychological literature
are compelling and the mixed results on stock market returns are significant enough to raise
the question whether the influence is channelled through various mechanisms, which may
be nonlinear (see Keller et al., 2004). In labour economics, it has been argued that labour
productivity increases during raining days as workers substitute leisure time with more time at
work. New psychological findings suggest that bad weather increases individual productivity
by eliminating potential distractions from good weather (Lee et al., 2014). This finding is
somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom that bad weather causes a negative mood and
hence impairs executive functions. This finding also motivates my study to consider both
attention and mood as potential drivers of investors trading behaviour.
In addition to the evidence of weather effect from the psychology literature, the roles of
attention and mood in economics and financial markets have also been widely discussed. Both
factors are considered as constraints to rational investment decision making. A comprehensive
recent survey of the psychological basis for mood influencing the perception of risk is
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discussed by Loewenstein et al. (2001). In this paper, a “risk-as-feeling” model is developed
to act as a descriptive model of decision making under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
Specifically, they concentrate on how decision making under the influence of emotion
deviates from rational or optimal decision making. Attention to the financial information
and irrelevant news also affects the degree of risk aversion on current evaluation and future
outlook of the investment portfolio. In this context, the attention is seen as a risk, namely
“attention-induced" risk, with respect to deriving the utility of information during the investors
decision making process (Karlsson et al., 2009; Andrei and Hasler, 2015). Therefore, both
mood and attention play a role in affecting investors risk perceptions, and subsequently,
market behaviour.
Furthermore, attention and mood not only affect investors attitude towards risk and asset
assessment, they could also interchangeably dominate the decision-making conditions, which
makes it even more difficult to identify the mechanism that ultimately determines investor
trading activities. Emotion can be overridden by deliberate attention which will enhance
the information process ability, at the same time, the irrelevant but salient stimuli which
draw investors attention may also cause emotional bias (Simon, 1982; Kahneman, 2003).
Yet, in the existing literature, they are often treated separately when it comes to study the
their behavioural implication for the financial market. Consequently, it is simply biased to
attribute weather-market anomaly to either attention or mood since these two conditions
frequently interact with each other and it is hard to observe and determine at which point one
is in dominance. Therefore, I jointly study both factors in order to disentangle the respective
impact on the trading behaviour and market performances.
By studying the weather impact on trading volume, I am not only able to investigate
investor behaviour mechanism, but also help to understand the performance of return volatility
because of well documented positive correlation between volatility and volume (Gallant
et al., 1992). Furthermore, I focus on trading volume rather than returns since the former
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will capture more trading and information activity whereas the reaction to the shock may
be unnoticeable in the returns process (Andersen, 1996) which means that misleading
conclusions could be drawn. There are two further advangtages of using trading volume to
understand the psychological and cognitive trading behaviour. In one respect, motivated by
sentiment literature, the process governing the rate of change in belief ensues the trading
volume, while overconfidence serves to amplify the effects of representativeness in generating
trading volume (Shefrin, 2008). This means that trading volume is able to capture the
investors sentiment if investors perspectives are under influence of weather-induced mood.
In a second respect, information processing capacity is conditional on investors attention
allocation to market securities or distraction from weather related events., and change in
trading volume is in response to the arrival of new information (Sims, 2003; Andersen, 1996).
From these two perspectives, the theoretical nature of trading volume emphasizes that it
stems from changes in investor beliefs associated with new information.
3.2.3 Weather, absenteeism, productivity
It is apparent that severe weather should hamper the productivity of work that occurs outdoors
(for example, Burke et al., 2014; Deschênes and Greenstone, 2012, in agriculture). Rather,
findings in office labour productivity and manufacturing suggest that heat has large negative
effects for productivity (for example, Jones and Olken, 2010, industrial output of trades).
In terms of productivity in stock market, a recent study by McTier et al. (2013) examines
the US stock market effects of influenza and finds evidence from 25 countries and 15 major
international cities that an increase in the incidence of flu would coincide with a decrease in
trading and return volatility. This finding suggests that the absence of key market participants
reduces information flows and the production of information which is consistent with greater
absenteeism implying less information production.
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The study by Cachon et al. (2012) is more interesting to me because they investigate
the impact of weather on manufacturing which happens indoors and presumably occurs
in the presence of air conditioning. They use weekly production data from 64 automobile
plants in the US over a ten-year period and find that adverse weather conditions, such as
excess heat and rain, lead to a significant reduction in production. The magnitude of effect
varies from location to location. They also find the weather shocks increase the volatility
of production. In contrast to the conclusion drawn by Lee et al. (2014), where the good
weather is viewed as distraction whilst bad weather is regarded as an encouragement to work
more, it is concluded that “a blizzard can disrupt production” because of worker absenteeism
while it is unclear the extent to which automobile companies are aware of the impact of
weather on their productivity with regard to the cognitive functioning. In addition to the
finding of the disruptive weather on manufacturing productivity, the latest study shows that
interruptions and other distractions consume 28% of the day for the knowledge worker
thereby diminishing efficiency and productivity. The overall distraction cost is $588 billion
per annum in the United States alone (Spira and Feintuch, 2005). Together with the findings
in Lee et al. (2014), which treat good weather as a potential distraction for outdoor and
leisure activities and result in a loss of productivity, adverse weather can also be a distraction
as, for example, workers may be late at work due to the disruption of transportation,or, leave
early or absenteeism. As a result, the productivity of investors measured by trading volume
will be affected.
3.3 Hypothesis formulation
Taken together, the arguments from the previous section lead us to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis I. Good (bad) weather conditions, such as lack of rain, that increase (de-
crease) the salience and attractiveness of outdoor options, will decrease (increase) the
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productivity of market participants and will lead to lower (higher) levels of trading activity.
Hypothesis II. The effect of weather on productivity and trading activity is nonlinear and
depends on the level of weather variables and their interaction.
Similar hypotheses are examined in a different empirical setting using survey and lab-
oratory data by Lee et al. (2014). In addition to rain, as a possible productivity driver, the
authors control for the effect of other variables such as temperature and visibility. Moreover,
the nonlinear effect of weather is also considered through linear and quadratic terms as
productivity could be higher with either low or high temperature, for example.
3.4 Empirical analysis
The next subsection will describe the weather and stock market datasets used, how these
are pre-processed and what are their basic statistical properties. The following subsection
presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis.
3.4.1 Sample description
Following much of the literature on the economic and financial effect of weather I include
four weather variables in the sample: sky cloud cover (CLOUD), precipitation (RAIN),
snow (SNOW) and temperature (TEMP). I obtain the weather data from National Climatic
Data Center (NCDC, data available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/). This database
includes hourly summaries of weather variables from different observation stations. I use the
observations from major airports near 31 cities for consistency of measurement across the
globe. These cities are chosen on the basis that they host major stock exchanges.
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I use sky cloud cover as one of the weather variables, as recent empirical evidence suggests
that it is strongly related to stock market returns due to its influence on mood. Market index
returns tend to be higher during sunny days as opposed to cloudier days (Hirshleifer and
Shumway, 2003; Chang et al., 2008). The variable of cloud cover, is recorded hourly on
a 10-point scale as: Clear (0), Scattered(1-4), Broken(5-7), Overcast(8), Obscured (9) and
Partial Obscuration (10). I first eliminated errors and missing values. Then I computed for
each day the daily cloud cover by taking the average of the data from 6.00 to 16.00 so that it
roughly corresponds with the work and trading day. The purpose of using the pre-market
hours is to investigate the potential weather effect on investor’s mood before the trading
activity and also effects related to commuting (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Loughran
and Schultz, 2004).
In addition to sky cloud cover, precipitation is another weather variable proposed in the
literature, yet with arguable results. Even though Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find that
rain is unrelated to market returns after controlling for cloud cover, Dowling and Lucey
(2005) use above average rainfall in the study and find a significant and negative impact on
equity returns for the Irish market. Moreover, Lee et al. (2014) have argued that this variable
has an effect on worker productivity. Motivated by these findings, I use daily total rainfall or
melted snow in the study to investigate the aggregated effect from the rainfall.
Temperature and snow have been found to have a significant relation to market returns
and trading activity (e.g., see Cao and Wei, 2005; Loughran and Schultz, 2004) so I include
both in the study. Temperature refers to the mean temperature for the day in Fahrenheit
degrees to tenths while overall depth of snow is expressed in inches to tenths.
After the raw data collection, I deseaonalise the weather time series as frequently done
in the weather literature in finance to capture the weather shocks. So, I first compute the
historical mean of each weather variable for each calendar week in the sample and then I
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subtract this mean from the daily weather value to obtain the seasonally-adjusted weather
values.
Table 3.1 summarizes the description of the weather variables used in the study.
Table 3.1 Description of weather variables
Weather Variable Description
TEMP Mean temperature for the day in degrees Fahrenheit to tenths (.1 Fahren-
heit); deseasonalise it by subtracting weekly mean (5 days a week) of
whole sample period from mean temperature for the day (TEMP).
RAIN Total precipitation (rain and/or melted snow) reported during the day in
inches and hundredths (.01 inches); deseasonalise the daily precipitation
by same method as described above.
SNOW Snow depth in inches to tenths (.1 inches); deseasonalise the daily snow
depth using same method as above.
CLOUD Average hourly sky cover data from 6.00 to 16.00 (from 0 as clear to 10
as partial obscuration); deseasonalise sky cloud cover as above.
Descriptive statistics of the weather variable under consideration for individual countries
shown in Table 3.2 indicates considerable heterogeneity in the sample.
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of raw weather variables for individual cities
Market Mean Obs. S.D C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Amsterdam
Temperature 51.3644 3074 11.2595 0.2192 -0.2225 2.4542
Precipitation 0.0857 3074 0.1859 2.1688 4.2124 28.1501
Snow 0.0192 3074 1.0659 55.4437 55.4166 3072.0000
Sky Cloud Cover 4.7141 3074 1.9445 0.4125 -0.4568 2.4895
Athens
Temperature 65.7288 3187 13.9537 0.2123 -0.0183 1.9994
Precipitation 0.0002 3187 0.0080 49.2959 55.0448 3072.6870
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Snow 0.0000 3187 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 3.4017 3180 2.1353 0.6277 0.1400 2.0412
Buenos Aires
Temperature 64.4000 2557 9.6639 0.1501 -0.0701 2.0839
Precipitation 0.1152 2557 0.4301 3.7337 7.3162 77.4721
Snow 0.0000 2557 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 3.3802 2529 2.5541 0.7556 0.3492 1.8617
Bangkok
Temperature 84.2494 2932 2.9968 0.0356 -0.7036 4.8951
Precipitation 0.2040 2932 0.5098 2.4990 4.4034 30.7240
Snow 0.0000 2932 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 5.4699 2932 1.5350 0.2806 -0.6691 2.5844
Brussels
Temperature 51.5648 3325 11.6654 0.2262 -0.2074 2.5022
Precipitation 0.0837 3325 0.2237 2.6742 10.9446 202.1705
Snow 0.0725 3325 1.2572 17.3311 43.9326 2184.4150
Sky Cloud Cover 4.5212 3325 1.5483 0.3425 -0.5116 2.6743
Copenhagen
Temperature 48.5982 3251 12.2926 0.2529 -0.0725 2.0253
Precipitation 0.0553 3251 0.1493 2.6973 6.8435 81.1222
Snow 0.2772 3251 2.9872 10.7762 30.6367 1084.2850
Sky Cloud Cover 4.7815 3249 1.7498 0.3660 -0.5662 2.4382
Dublin
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Temperature 48.6111 3287 12.2584 0.2522 -0.0773 2.0372
Precipitation 0.0553 3287 0.1485 2.6861 6.8412 81.6352
Snow 0.2711 3287 2.9610 10.9235 31.0687 1110.7940
Sky Cloud Cover 5.3216 3287 1.3188 0.2478 -0.6714 2.8166
Frankfurt
Temperature 47.8327 3181 13.3252 0.2786 -0.1266 2.3487
Precipitation 0.1520 3181 0.3718 2.4467 4.9918 42.0384
Snow 0.0404 3181 0.4102 10.1468 11.9057 156.5448
Sky Cloud Cover 5.2258 3109 1.7104 0.3273 -0.7485 3.3971
Helsinki
Temperature 43.3173 3181 16.9586 0.3915 -0.3389 2.5728
Precipitation 0.0721 3181 0.1699 2.3556 5.7804 67.5330
Snow 2.8575 3181 6.6500 2.3272 2.6409 9.1261
Sky Cloud Cover 5.0464 3179 1.7411 0.3450 -0.5561 2.3962
Hong Kong
Temperature 75.6554 3205 9.6759 0.1279 -0.6593 2.5085
Precipitation 0.1936 3205 0.6524 3.3706 5.9477 49.0080
Snow 0.0000 3205 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 3.7979 3205 1.6807 0.4425 -0.0186 2.1792
Istanbul
Temperature 60.3185 2265 13.8746 0.2300 -0.0686 1.9043
Precipitation 0.0538 2265 0.1569 2.9133 4.6695 31.4031
Snow 0.0528 2265 0.8914 16.8823 35.6670 1488.2930
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Sky Cloud Cover 3.1381 2265 2.0360 0.6488 0.0447 1.8498
Johannesburg
Temperature 61.4829 2813 7.8339 0.1274 -0.5245 2.7712
Precipitation 0.0762 2813 0.2208 2.8968 4.4348 27.7443
Snow 0.0000 2813 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 2.6550 2794 1.8235 0.6868 0.2409 2.4897
Kuala Lumpur
Temperature 82.2827 3203 2.0904 0.0254 -0.0409 2.7130
Precipitation 0.3068 3203 0.6312 2.0571 5.4203 78.7145
Snow 0.0000 3203 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 6.0832 3194 0.2705 0.0445 4.0382 32.0739
London
Temperature 52.5938 6859 9.9824 0.1898 -0.0426 2.3891
Precipitation 0.0671 6859 0.1929 2.8745 23.4776 1108.3730
Snow 0.0213 6859 0.3385 15.8920 51.5324 3454.1060
Sky Cloud Cover 5.0089 6759 1.8561 0.3706 -0.5189 2.7083
Madrid
Temperature 58.9591 3272 14.4069 0.2444 0.1234 1.8613
Precipitation 0.0369 3272 0.1306 3.5370 6.0300 55.8754
Snow 0.0000 3272 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 3.1858 3264 2.0010 0.6281 0.1795 2.1243
Milan
Temperature 54.5911 2648 14.9693 0.2742 -0.0911 1.8804
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Precipitation 0.1892 2648 0.8395 4.4363 7.6778 75.7473
Snow 0.0000 2648 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 3.6820 2636 2.4020 0.6524 0.2884 2.0823
Manila
Temperature 82.3009 3186 2.6839 0.0326 0.0706 2.9161
Precipitation 0.0552 3186 0.4211 7.6284 19.2439 537.7364
Snow 0.0000 3186 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 4.9103 3186 1.8271 0.3721 0.2211 1.7039
Oslo
Temperature 41.7553 3039 15.8836 0.3804 -0.3168 2.4066
Precipitation 0.0943 3039 0.2346 2.4883 6.6385 89.1102
Snow 1.6018 3039 4.5899 2.8654 3.3010 13.9773
Sky Cloud Cover 5.3974 3026 1.8477 0.3423 -0.3457 2.2609
Paris
Temperature 53.6363 3221 12.1579 0.2267 -0.1244 2.3901
Precipitation 0.0630 3221 0.1455 2.3087 4.2647 27.2580
Snow 0.0243 3221 0.2108 8.6722 12.0900 173.5793
Sky Cloud Cover 5.0499 3216 1.7941 0.3553 -0.7682 2.9300
Seoul
Temperature 54.6597 2976 17.5479 0.3210 -0.2672 1.9353
Precipitation 0.1495 2976 0.5669 3.7930 7.3052 72.0550
Snow 0.0688 2976 0.4850 7.0483 10.9945 169.1263
Sky Cloud Cover 3.8475 2972 2.7111 0.7047 0.0823 1.6775
Continued on next page
48 Do investors save trading for a rainy day?
Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Singapore
Temperature 82.0179 1516 2.1303 0.0260 -0.2277 2.7510
Precipitation 0.2457 1516 0.5715 2.3258 5.0435 46.0852
Snow 0.0000 1516 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 5.6745 1516 0.5270 0.0929 -0.5225 5.3089
New York
Temperature 54.7294 4531 16.1378 0.2949 -0.1511 2.0739
Precipitation 0.1233 4531 0.3425 2.7768 5.2994 43.8771
Snow 0.2633 4531 1.4368 5.4573 8.8498 103.0157
Sky Cloud Cover 4.7809 4528 2.4898 0.5208 -0.1797 1.7014
São Paulo
Temperature 68.2452 3217 6.3177 0.0926 -0.2935 2.7037
Precipitation 0.1175 3217 0.4040 3.4370 7.8789 109.5381
Snow 0.0000 3217 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 4.4988 3214 2.3308 0.5181 -0.3877 2.1132
Santiago
Temperature 58.7045 2194 9.3425 0.1591 -0.0434 1.9652
Precipitation 0.0180 2194 0.1090 6.0460 10.4139 152.0586
Snow 0.0000 2194 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 2.6927 2185 2.7383 1.0169 0.6173 1.9104
Stockholm
Temperature 44.9137 3263 14.9612 0.3331 -0.1698 2.3031
Precipitation 0.0000 3263 0.0002 57.1227 57.0964 3261.0000
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Snow 0.0000 3263 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 4.0754 3103 1.9461 0.4775 -0.4704 2.4744
Sydney
Temperature 65.2918 3067 7.6383 0.1170 0.0313 2.1794
Precipitation 0.0973 3067 0.3073 3.1580 5.9398 50.2108
Snow 0.0004 3067 0.0217 55.3805 55.3534 3065.0000
Sky Cloud Cover 3.9253 3063 1.9200 0.4891 -0.1423 2.0638
Tokyo
Temperature 61.6300 3253 13.6753 0.2219 0.0283 1.8186
Precipitation 0.1734 3253 0.5033 2.9033 5.4820 45.8773
Snow 0.0000 3253 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 5.1233 3253 2.1545 0.4205 -0.4094 2.1384
Taipei
Temperature 74.4153 2979 9.6176 0.1292 -0.3397 2.1132
Precipitation 0.2201 2943 0.5674 2.5780 4.3849 27.7228
Snow 0.0000 2979 0.0000 . . .
Sky Cloud Cover 5.8455 2979 1.8543 0.3172 -0.5675 2.1910
Toronto
Temperature 48.8006 3202 17.0258 0.3489 -0.2178 2.1842
Precipitation 0.0791 3202 0.2080 2.6287 4.8548 39.9749
Snow 0.7281 3193 2.0224 2.7778 3.5244 16.3272
Sky Cloud Cover 3.5359 3203 2.9688 0.8396 0.1979 1.4812
Vienna
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Market Mean Obs. S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
Temperature 51.6642 3221 15.2754 0.2957 -0.1822 2.1255
Precipitation 0.0629 3221 0.1767 2.8087 5.7499 51.3582
Snow 0.2312 3221 1.3850 5.9912 15.5332 368.9210
Sky Cloud Cover 4.8814 3218 1.7105 0.3504 -0.4756 2.4220
Zurich
Temperature 49.8563 3020 13.8736 0.2783 -0.1176 2.1400
Precipitation 0.1062 3020 0.2485 2.3396 4.2965 29.6531
Snow 0.1600 3020 0.7080 4.4247 6.5361 56.8718
Sky Cloud Cover 4.7906 3020 1.7172 0.3584 -0.4470 2.4666
Total
Temperature 58.4525 104698 16.9764 0.2904 -0.2557 2.4409
Precipitation 0.1061 104662 0.3690 3.4775 9.5521 169.9314
Snow 0.2228 104689 1.8305 8.2141 17.5953 611.2066
Sky Cloud Cover 4.5333 104236 2.1801 0.4809 -0.3689 2.2138
I now turn to trading volume which is my main dependent variable under study against
which I shall test the hypotheses. Aggregate turnover, which is defined as the total number of
shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding, is considered in the literature
as a natural measure of trading activity (Campbell and Wang, 1993; Stickel and Verrecchia,
1994; Lo and Wang, 2000). So I use the value of shares traded as a measure of trading activity
in each city and draw the relevant data from Bloomberg.
I investigate 33 markets corresponding to 31 cities weather where the stock exchanges
are listed. For the US, I include the S&P 500, NASDAQ composite and Dow Jones Industrial
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Average. I collect daily observations from each market excluding holidays and weekends.
The period ranges from 2001 to 2013 for 29 markets, which are the earliest available data
for volume, with exception for FTSE 100 and S&P 500 which start from 1986 and 1996,
respectively.
After collecting the raw data, I apply three transformations. First, following Lo and
Wang (2000), as share turnover is highly persistent with strong autocorrelation, I apply
log-linear detrending to induce stationarity. Second, as after the detrending process the data
still contain periodic components, I remove the calendar regularities by regression against
monthly dummies. Lastly, in order to reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers, I
winsorise the processed data by limiting 1% of the extreme values in the sample, and I denote
as υit . More specifically, the process can be expressed below:
Vˆit = logVit − (aˆi+ bˆit) (3.1)
Vˆit = ci0+ ci1Janit + ci2Febit + ci3Marit + . . . ,+ci11Novit +νit
Where Vit is the raw share turnover for each market index i at time t, Vˆit is logarithmic
linear detrended volume, the residuals νit from deseasonalised Vˆit are winsorised at 98%
percentile denoting as υit . Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics of filtered trading volume
under study. Again I can observe a large variation in the location and dispersion of the
distributions under study for different markets. The results of standard unit root tests on the
transformed data, shown in Table 3.4, confirm that the stationary has been achieved.
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of stock market trading volume
Index Location Obs. Mean S.D. C.V. Skew. Kurt.
AEX Amsterdam (AMS) 3074 0.0014 0.3837 278.2792 0.4140 3.3370
ASE Athens (ATH) 3188 -0.0005 0.7617 -1498.9210 0.0342 2.2306
MERVAL Buenos Aires (BAI) 2558 0.0031 0.4938 158.4356 -0.1944 2.8095
SET Bangkok (BKK) 2935 0.0006 0.5037 797.7829 0.0016 3.1078
BEL 20 Brussels (BRU) 3325 0.0023 0.4402 190.6760 0.0738 2.6910
KFX Copenhagen (COP) 3251 0.0010 0.4277 449.1210 0.1128 2.5893
DJIA New York (DJ) 3521 0.0017 0.2694 159.7136 0.3765 3.1007
IESQ 20 Dublin (DUB) 3287 0.0035 0.5920 169.9906 0.2361 2.7506
DAX Frankfurt (FRK) 3181 -0.0003 0.4088 -1540.7510 0.6088 3.1511
OMX Helsinki Helsinki (HEL) 3181 0.0008 0.4688 569.6283 0.4674 2.8031
Hang Seng Index Hong Kong (HKG) 3205 0.0009 0.5027 568.6865 0.6624 3.1932
BIST 30 Istanbul (IST) 2265 0.0018 0.3212 181.9431 -0.2838 3.0181
FTSE/JSE Johannesburg (JOH) 2817 0.0043 0.3622 84.2887 -0.1630 3.0750
FTSE Bursa
Malaysia KLCI
Kuala Lumpur
(KLU)
3203 0.0004 0.4829 1112.0070 0.3806 2.8708
FTSE 100 London (LDN) 6859 0.0008 0.5880 711.8085 -0.1546 2.0588
IBEX 35 Madrid (MAD) 3272 0.0001 0.4698 5393.1650 0.2076 2.5641
FTSE MIB Milan (MIL) 2648 0.0006 0.3717 639.0565 0.2129 2.7003
PSEi Index Manila (MNL) 3189 0.0001 0.4914 4123.8360 0.0429 3.1683
NASDAQ New York (NQ) 3052 0.0017 0.2910 170.8583 0.3111 2.8825
OSEAX Oslo (OSL) 3039 0.0004 0.6496 1773.8050 0.0480 2.1101
CAC 40 Paris (PAR) 3221 0.0026 0.3643 141.3732 0.2817 3.1204
KOSPI Seoul (SEO) 2977 0.0002 0.3554 1676.5520 0.0790 2.3026
FTSE ST All-Share Singapore (SIN) 1516 0.0013 0.2883 228.1310 -0.1459 2.9982
S&P 500 New York (SP) 4531 0.0009 0.4208 459.2224 -0.4012 2.7985
BOVESPA São Paulo (SPL) 3217 0.0010 0.3918 393.2249 -0.0279 2.8288
IPSA Santiago (STG) 2194 0.0010 0.4139 414.4218 0.0894 2.9327
OMX Stockholm 30 Stockholm (STK) 3263 0.0002 0.3693 1613.3700 0.0583 2.8295
S&P ASX 200 Sydney (SYD) 3068 0.0007 0.3579 485.4716 -0.0186 2.8800
Nikkei 225 Tokyo (TKY) 3253 0.0010 0.4516 474.3718 0.3322 2.3381
TAIEX Taipei (TPI) 2983 0.0006 0.3579 563.3495 -0.0793 2.6842
S&P TSX
Composite
Toronto (TRT) 3204 0.0014 0.3605 259.7298 -0.2167 3.2703
ATX Vienna (VIE) 3221 -0.0002 0.7697 -4166.8130 0.2065 2.0448
Swiss Market Index Zurich (ZUR) 3020 0.0001 0.4251 4381.3410 0.5705 3.0298
Total 104718 0.0010 0.4669 446.7966 0.1237 3.2533
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Table 3.4 Stationarity analysis of stock market trading volume
ADF Phillips-Perron
none const. c, trend none const. c, trend
AMS -0.409 -3.8058*** -4.3526*** -0.5306 -28.5024*** -30.7279***
ATH -0.2042 -3.9537*** -3.9911*** -0.292 -18.1830*** -18.3009***
BAI -0.0248 -7.0587*** -7.0632*** -0.3103 -36.5514*** -36.5421***
BKK 0.0564 -3.9779*** -5.6658*** 0.4142 -8.9821*** -18.3885***
BRU -0.0443 -3.4842*** -4.4647*** -0.3497 -22.6735*** -35.8285***
COP -0.0197 -3.5161*** -4.0290*** -0.1337 -26.6039*** -31.0922***
DUB -0.224 -2.9862** -3.4850** -0.5682 -37.1564*** -39.7746***
FRK -0.1293 -4.1697*** -4.1589*** -0.342 -36.0001*** -36.0139***
HEL -0.3595 -3.2050** -3.6285** -0.4573 -29.7827*** -33.1567***
HKG 0.1459 -2.2627 -4.5660*** 0.2223 -8.1676*** -23.7763***
IST 0.0951 -4.0644*** -7.3515*** 0.3939 -17.1020*** -29.0935***
JOH 0.2240 -2.9865** -7.6345*** -0.0489 -17.2961*** -35.2758***
KLU 0.0217 -4.2708*** -6.7032*** 0.0695 -11.8328*** -25.2367***
LDN 0.3416 -2.2995 -2.5300 -0.0002 -11.9577*** -31.5519***
MAD -0.1577 -5.3215*** -5.6183*** -0.3183 -30.9617*** -33.6643***
MIL -0.1659 -3.6367*** -4.3745*** -0.3746 -21.5366*** -24.3362***
MNL 0.2099 -1.9873 -6.4748*** 0.3262 -10.0160*** -39.8402***
OSL 0.0203 -2.4779 -2.3777 0.0546 -8.5587*** -8.4025***
PAR -0.3955 -4.6506*** -4.7401*** -0.4993 -36.8620*** -37.1448***
SEO -0.1694 -3.4277*** -4.4845*** -0.306 -8.2412*** -16.0565***
SPL 0.5573 -1.6883 -3.9939*** 0.5045 -7.9615*** -34.3972***
SIN -0.2447 -7.6182*** -8.0340*** -0.2991 -23.1231*** -23.7210***
STG 0.1395 -5.7559*** -7.1009*** 0.0656 -38.4040*** -41.0902***
STK -0.2888 -5.1500*** -5.1966*** -0.3416 -35.4123*** -35.7346***
SYD 0.1249 -3.2998** -3.7663** -0.271 -27.7135*** -36.1060***
TKY 0.3304 -2.7949* -3.1576* 0.3696 -11.4369*** -15.0179***
TPI -0.2746 -5.8289*** -5.8737*** -0.4077 -18.7077*** -18.8087***
TRT -0.0386 -2.4152 -5.4655*** -0.1662 -30.5067*** -39.3935***
VIE -0.0583 -2.8473* -2.9500 -0.403 -11.9829*** -15.1870***
ZUR -0.1936 -3.1579** -3.2893* -0.1914 -29.8621*** -30.5388***
SP 0.1061 -3.4269** -3.4571** 0.0975 -21.9653*** -21.9710***
DJ -0.6859 -4.9786*** -8.1574*** -0.5805 -30.2725*** -46.3489***
NQ -0.4728 -4.8835*** -5.8447*** -0.6522 -20.3203*** -26.4982***
ADF and Phillips–Perron refer to augmented Dickey–Fuller test and Phillips–Perron test for a unit root (Dickey
and Fuller, 1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988). ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively.
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3.4.2 Results
3.4.2.1 Hypothesis I.: Does bad weather increase trading activity?
I first take the classic approach in the literature (Saunders Jr, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway,
2003; Dell et al., 2014; Symeonidis et al., 2010), estimating simple regressions by ordinary
least squares separately for each market in the sample. Specifically, I estimate the parameters
of the regression as follows:
υit = αi+βi1T EMPit +βi2RAINit +βi3SNOWit +βi4CLOUDit + εit (3.2)
Where υit are the transformed trading volume values for market i at time t. In line with
the empirical literature in this area, I find some significant relationship with mixed coefficient
signs. Specifically, the results show that temperature has significant impact on 10 out 33
markets whilst the positive or negative relationship is mixed. For eight countries I find that
trading volumes are affected by precipitation. Trading volumes increase significantly with
rainfall in six out of eight markets whereas negative impact of rain is found in Manila and
Stockholm markets. In general, snow has an adverse influence on the trading volumes except
for Istanbul, London and Amsterdam. As for sky cloud cover, the results show that seven out
of thirty-three markets are negatively affected by sky cover except for London. Table 3.5
reports full details of the results for the whole sample. The overall results suggest a weak
indication that cloud and snow are inversely related to trading volume. In this regard, the
results of sky cover are in line with the mood literature which postulates that more cloud
is linked to a downward mood and, thereby, leads to a less active trading behaviour. The
results for snow are consistent with the findings by Loughran and Schultz (2004) suggesting
that it causes disruption for investors, while the impact is less clear for precipitation and
temperature.
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However, the simple regression estimation faces potential omitted variable bias and
problems related to over-controlling. More importantly, this form of estimation is best for
assessing the long-term historical effect of weather rather than to focus on the contemporary
effect of climate on economic activity (Auffhammer et al., 2013). Then, I use panel regression
methodology to control for heterogeneity problem cross the countries and climate zones.
This is also justified by the descriptive statistics which show a large variation between the
markets under study.
Table 3.5 Regression analysis of the weather effect on trading volume for individual markets
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD
AMS 0.0030 0.0434 0.0113*** -0.0047
(1.3540) (0.8934) (5.9213) (-1.0548)
ATH 0.0034 3.0744*** -0.0022
(0.6553) (6.0964) (-0.2054)
BAI -0.0028 -0.0301 -0.0006
(-0.9205) (-1.1249) (-0.1298)
BKK -0.0008 0.0141 -0.0455***
(-0.1076) (0.6383) (-3.8945)
BRU -0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0091** -0.0047
(-0.7158) (-0.1230) (-2.2479) (-0.7229)
COP 0.0065** 0.0925 -0.0016 -0.0120**
(2.3121) (1.5250) (-0.7754) (-2.1585)
DUB 0.0129*** 0.1606** -0.0044 -0.0024
(3.4128) (2.1233) (-1.3191) (-0.2891)
FRK 0.0007 0.0313 -0.0471** 0.0067
(0.3816) (1.2800) (-2.4228) (1.2445)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD
HEL 0.0017 0.1076** -0.0122*** -0.0049
(0.8178) (1.9649) (-3.8893) (-0.7704)
HKG -0.0016 0.0005 0.0018
(-0.4381) (0.0320) (0.1989)
IST 0.0008 0.0055 0.0087* 0.0013
(0.3667) (0.1069) (1.9278) (0.2768)
JOH 0.0002 0.0403 -0.0076
(0.1026) (1.0394) (-1.1848)
KLU -0.0308*** -0.0176 -0.0503
(-4.1825) (-1.2590) (-1.3151)
LDN 0.0070*** 0.0392 0.0267* 0.0488***
(2.9051) (1.1573) (1.8255) (7.0725)
MAD -0.0026 0.1072 -0.0060
(-0.9543) (1.4454) (-1.0107)
MIL 0.0017 0.0421*** -0.0052
(0.6361) (4.9976) (-1.1356)
MNL 0.0108 -0.0301** 0.0119
(1.2952) (-2.2335) (1.3412)
OSL 0.0059* 0.0600 -0.0104 0.0116
(1.8868) (0.9145) (-1.5651) (1.2734)
PAR -0.0021 0.0626 -0.1024** -0.0013
(-1.1357) (1.2478) (-2.4468) (-0.2813)
SEO -0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0060 -0.0027
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD
(-0.1640) (-0.1858) (-0.2437) (-0.8534)
SIN 0.0123** 0.0012 -0.0084
(2.5322) (0.0890) (-0.5160)
SPL -0.0067*** 0.0542*** -0.0076
(-2.8136) (2.6155) (-1.6217)
STG -0.0110*** -0.0113 -0.0078**
(-3.5955) (-0.1477) (-1.9724)
STK 0.0036** -54.8943*** 0.0035
(2.1530) (-4.9987) (0.7716)
SYD 0.0006 -0.0160 -0.3257*** 0.0031
(0.3158) (-0.6624) (-5.3019) (0.8159)
TKY 0.0004 -0.0100 0.0056
(0.1243) (-0.6961) (1.1730)
TPI -0.0035 0.0067 -0.0038
(-1.5097) (0.5424) (-0.7027)
TRT 0.0002 0.0242 -0.0016 -0.0062**
(0.1500) (0.7170) (-0.2321) (-2.2803)
VIE 0.0003 0.0832 -0.0034 -0.0335***
(0.0892) (0.9310) (-0.2376) (-2.7620)
ZUR 0.0010 0.0679* -0.0185 -0.0122
(0.4383) (1.6735) (-0.9420) (-1.6450)
NQ 0.0036*** 0.0006 -0.0220*** -0.0058**
(2.7872) (0.0421) (-3.8916) (-2.4008)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD
DJ 0.0009 0.0192 -0.0127** -0.0036*
(0.8158) (1.4460) (-2.2441) (-1.7140)
SP 0.0005 0.0099 -0.0135 -0.0038
(0.2910) (0.5460) (-1.2635) (-1.2489)
This table gives the value of the coefficients bi1 in regression with deseasonalised and detrended trading volume
as the dependent variable and deseaonslised weather as independent variables, respectively. Numbers in
brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are
estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
So in the next step of the analysis, I conduct a panel regression test with fixed-effects
for 31 markets (S&P500 is used for the US market). Based on recent developments in the
climate-economics literature, I investigate the weather shock on financial market using the
panel regression method by relying on deviations from averages:
υit = γ+δWit +µi+ eit (3.3)
Where Wit represents a vector containing the weather variables. The fixed effects for the
spatial areas, µi, absorb fixed spatial characteristics, whether observed or unobserved, disen-
tangling the shock from many possible sources of omitted variable bias.
The results in Table 3.6 show that snow is inversely related to volume whilst temperature
and rain have significant and positive effect on trading volumes when deseasonalised weather
variables are used as regressors. Temperature appears to be irrelevant when raw value is
used in the regression. This finding is consistent with the study by Fruehwirth and Sögner
(2012) suggesting that only temperature contains a strong seasonality and deseasonalistion
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is necessary. The results of rain and snow support the findings by Lee et al. (2014) and
Loughran and Schultz (2004), suggesting that investors are more productive during the rainy
days as the outdoor distractions are less appealing while snow reduces trading volume by
causing inconvenience to investors.
Table 3.6 Fixed-effects panel regression analysis of the weather effect on trading volume
Filtered Coefficient Raw Coefficient
TEMP 0.0014** TEMP -1.41E-05
(2.5278) (-0.0405)
RAIN 0.0138*** RAIN 0.0128***
(3.2688) (3.1844)
SNOW -0.0091*** SNOW -0.0071***
(-6.2829) (-6.8734)
CLOUD 0.0005 CLOUD 0.0002
(0.4837) (0.2122)
Constant 0.0026 Constant 0.0027
(0.4715) (0.1240)
Observations 97615 Observations 97626
Adjusted R2 0.0009 Adjusted R2 0.0005
This table gives the value of the coefficients δ in regression (3.3) with deseasonalised and detrended trading
volume as the dependent variable, and deseaonslised weather and raw weather as independent variables
respectively. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey
and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
‘Filtered’ column provides panel fixed-effect regression for 31 markets with filtered weather variables; ‘Raw’
columns provides panel fixed-effect regression for 31 markets with raw weather variables.
In order to better understand the disruptive effect of weather as a driver of trading activity
I also investigate the effect on worker absences for the US. Specifically, I use absence data
from the Labor Force Statistics of the Current Population Survey from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, as a measure of loss of productivity. The data provide the number of
full-time employees from non-agricultural industries that are either absent or work less than
full time due to the bad weather. The absence is recorded on a monthly interval dated back
to 1990. I regress raw weather value and filtered weather variables on logarithmic values of
absences and results are presented in Table 3.7. The results of the raw weather regression
60 Do investors save trading for a rainy day?
clearly suggest that rain, snow and low temperature increase absences. By using filtered
weather as regressor, only rain and low temperature show a significant impact on the increase
of absences. So the results show that bad weather has an adverse effect on productivity.
Table 3.7 Regression analysis of the effect of weather on absences for US
Filtered Coefficient Raw Coefficient
RAIN 1.7862* RAIN 2.0587***
(1.7614) (2.6243)
CLOUD 0.0716 CLOUD 0.0737
(0.6904) (1.3103)
SNOW 0.2011 SNOW 0.3140***
(1.2670) (3.4001)
TEMP -0.0631** TEMP -0.0269***
(-2.4147) (-6.4439)
Constant 5.7291 Constant 6.5058***
(79.2192) (14.8923)
Observations 216 Observations 216
Adjusted R2 0.1199 Adjusted R2 0.4805
The right half of table gives the results for logarithmic absence and raw weather. If I calculate the elasticity
of the absences on weather change, the absences are very sensitive to rain fall, snow and temperature. In
particular, 1% increase in rain results in 3% increase in absences whereas 1% drop in temperature increases
1.04% absences.
3.4.2.2 Hypothesis II.: Is the effect of weather on trading activity nonlinear?
The literature has often found a nonlinear relationship between climate and the economic
outcome of interest, with extremely warm temperatures being especially important. Although
this is more related to agriculture, the recent findings in indoor manufacturing activity
encourage us to explore the potential nonlinearity of weather effect within stock market.
First, I conduct quantile estimation for individual countries. The results, given in Table
B.1 and B.2 show mixed results of an asymmetric effect. For example, the top 10% of snow
in Copenhagen reduces trading volume significantly whilst the bottom 10% of snow has no
impact on trading volume. In order to further explore the asymmetric effect between volume
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and weather, I control for unobserved individual heterogeneity by quantile analysis in panel
data.
Following recent development on quantile regression for panel data, (Koenker, 2004),
I estimate directly a vector of individual weather effects. The fixed-effects estimator is
based on minimizing a weighted sum of 5 ordinary quantile regression objective functions
corresponding to a selection of 5 values of τ , (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9).
I will consider the following model for the conditional quantile functions of the response
of the tth observation on the ith individual country yit .
Qyit(τ|xit) = αi+ x′itβ (τ) t = 1, . . . ,mi, i = 1 . . . ,n. (3.4)
where xit is a vector of independent weather variables, depend on the quantile, τ , for
all quantiles τ is in the interval (0,1). Fixed effect α is a pure location shift effect on the
conditional quantiles of response, implying that the conditional distribution for each country’s
volume has the same shape, but different locations as long as the α’s are different. The effects
of the weather variables, xit are permitted to depend upon the quantile, τ , of interest, but the
α’s do not. The parameter β (τ) estimation increases the variability of the estimates of the
covariate effect, but shrinkage of these effects towards a common value helps to reduce this
additional variability. Thereby, the weather vector of fixed-effects coefficients are penalized
by a penalty term, shrinking these coefficients towards zero.
The results from Table 3.8 suggest that intercepts of the model are significant, which is
the estimated conditional quantile function of the each trading volume under the influence
of weather conditions when τ is 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9. It suggests that trading
volume decreases when it is sunny, and snowy (τ=0.1); while volume increases when there
is more rain and a low temperature. If the value of snow is above the average, the trading
volume decreases significantly. The result for rain is in line with existing attention literature,
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Table 3.8 Quantile fixed-effects panel regression analysis of the weather effect on trading
volume
τ(0.1) τ(0.25) τ(0.5) τ(0.75) τ(0.9)
TEMP 0.0019* 0.0009 0.0006 0.0020 0.0020
(1.7953) (1.2950) (0.8639) (1.5744) (1.4900)
RAIN 0.0089 0.0183*** 0.0136** 0.0124 0.0218
(1.1394) (2.7708) (2.4409) (1.5329) (1.5856)
SNOW -0.0082 -0.0055 -0.0084*** -0.0126*** -0.0074
(-0.6336) (-0.8930) (-2.7973) (-2.8061) (-1.5381)
CLOUD 0.0087 0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0046
(1.0580) (0.6017) (-0.4239) (-1.1687) (-1.6442)
Constant -0.5692*** -0.3019*** -0.0213*** 0.3087*** 0.6338***
(-21.2607) (-26.5211) (-4.2190) (18.8612) (21.6138)
This table gives the value of the coefficients β in regression (3.4). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. It provides panel fixed-effect regression for 31 markets,
condition on five different quantiles.
suggesting that considerable volume of rainfall increases productivity, that is, trading volume,
by eliminating potential distraction from good weather (Lee et al., 2014; Connolly, 2008).
I also consider the nonlinear effect of weather by examining indices which involve
interactions between variables to capture the “true feeling” on humans (e.g., see Shi and
Skuterud, 2015), For example, heat index has been studied by geographers interested in
identifying the ideal climate for particular tourism-related activities. De Freitas et al. (2008)
distinguish between three facets of weather: thermal, aesthetic and physical, where physical
elements such as rain and strong winds, tend to nullify the effect of thermal sensation
and aesthetic features of the weather. To capture thermal sensation, I use the heat index
widely reported in the United States so as to see the impact of “real-feel” temperature. The
computation of the index is a refinement of a result obtained by multiple regression analysis
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carried out by Rothfusz (1990). Specifically, the heat index is calculated as:
HI =−42.379+2.04901523∗T +10.14333127∗RH− .22475541∗T ∗RH
−.00683783∗T ∗T − .05481717∗RH ∗RH + .00122874∗T ∗T ∗RH
+.00085282∗T ∗RH ∗RH− .00000199∗T ∗T ∗RH ∗RH
(3.5)
where T is temperature in degrees Fahrenheit and RH is relative humidity in percent. HI is
the heat index expressed as an apparent temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Adjustments also
have been made when the temperature is below 80 degree Fahrenheit. The heat index for the
US is graphically depicted in Figure 3.1.
Fig. 3.1 Heat index for US
In order to further explore the asymmetric impact of heat on trading volume, I also
include higher order terms of the Heat Index (HI) in the regression. The results are shown in
Table 3.9. The trading volume increases with the heat as the environment becomes more
comfortable and less disruptive so that the productivity is enhanced; but at the higher heat,
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Table 3.9 Regression analysis of the effect of heat index on trading volume for US
Coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HI(-1) 0.0008***
(3.2092)
HI 0.0008*** -0.0007 1.0632***
(3.1734) (-0.5679) (62.9410)
HI2 0.0003*** -0.0197***
(3.4755) (-34.5129)
HI3 0.0001***
(24.6167)
This table gives the value of the coefficients of heat index on trading volume. Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,*
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report the
results of filtered heat index and volume; column (4) reports the results of raw heat index on logarithmic volume.
trading volume starts to increase at descending rate as the weather condition becomes a
distraction for leisure and outdoor activities so that the productivity is weakened; whilst the
heat reaches a caution level, the investors opt to focus more on trading and volume increases
again.
Motivated by the asymmetric heat impact on trading volume for US, I also investigate
whether temperature has an asymmetric impact on the panel data of 31 countries.2 I follow
the same fixed-effects method as in model (3.3) which can be written as:
υit = θ +κ1Wit +κ2T EMP2it +ξi+ψit (3.6)
Where Wit represents a vector containing weather variables, T EMP2 is included to test
the quadratic relationship between temperature and trading volume. The fixed effects for
the spatial areas, ξi, absorb fixed spatial characteristics, whether observed or unobserved,
disentangling the shock from many possible sources of omitted variable bias.
2The relative humidity data is not available for the rest of countries in the sample other than US, so that the
Heat Index can only be constructed for US. Therefore, I use a similar variable “temperature” to reflect HI in the
panel regression.
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The results from equation (3.6) are presented in Table 3.10. The impact from rain, snow
and temperature are consistent with panel regression in Section 3.4.2.1, which suggests
that rain and temperature increase productivity whereas snow has a significant and negative
impact on trading volume. When squared temperature is included in the model of using raw
weather values, the results are comparable to the heat index analysis. The trading volume
increases with the temperature as weather improves working condition so that the productivity
is enhanced; but as it increases, trading volume starts to decrease as the improved weather
condition becomes a distraction for leisure and outdoor activities so that the trading volume
is reduced. However, when I include T EMP3 in the model, unlike the heat index results, it
shows an insignificant impact on trading volume. For this result, I understand that the effect
is so marginal that the sample heterogeneity may debilitate this marginal effect.
Table 3.10 Fixed-effects panel regression of asymmetric weather effect on trading volume
Filtered Coefficient Raw Coefficient
RAIN 0.0139*** RAIN 0.0118***
(3.3036) (2.9375)
CLOUD 0.0004 CLOUD -0.0005
(0.3685) (-0.5198)
SNOW -0.0091*** SNOW -0.0055***
(-6.2735) (-5.7983)
TEMP 0.0014** TEMP 0.0046***
(2.3955) (4.1993)
TEMP2 -7.64E-05 TEMP2 -4.34E-05***
( -1.3128) (-4.5237)
Constant 0.0046 Constant 0.1022***
(0.8147) (-3.1819)
Observations 97615 Observations 97615
Adjusted R2 0.0009 Adjusted R2 0.0011
This table gives the value of the coefficients δ in regression (3.3) with deseasonalised and detrended trading
volume as the dependent variable, and deseaonslised weather and raw weather as independent variables
respectively. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey
and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
‘Filtered’ column provides panel fixed-effect regression for 31 markets with filtered weather variables; ‘Raw’
columns provides panel fixed-effect regression for 31 markets with raw weather variables.
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3.4.2.3 Effect of weather on attention and sentiment
I now examine the link between weather and direct measures of sentiment and attention.
For sentiment, I am limited by the availability of data for all 31 countries so that I use the
American Association of Individual Investors Investor Sentiment Survey (AAII) for US 3
between 1996 to 2013.
In the analysis of the AAII sentiment index, I regress it on US weather using contempora-
neous and lagged values. Results for the weekly AAII index are given in Table 3.11. In all
cases, I find that there is no significant weather effect on investor sentiment for the US.
Table 3.11 Regression analysis of the effect of weekly weather on sentiment for US
AAII AAII
RAINt -0.0459 RAINt-1 -0.0430
(-1.2579) (-1.2280)
CLOUDt 0.0058 CLOUDt-1 2.74E-05
(1.2695) (0.0054)
SNOWt -0.0098 SNOWt-1 -0.0035
(-1.2448) (-0.5773)
TEMPt -0.0017 TEMPt-1 -0.0017
(-1.0140) (-1.0629)
Constant 0.0751*** Constant 0.0753***
(5.8901) (5.8893)
Observations 937 Observations 936
Adjusted R2 0.0015 Adjusted R2 -0.0014
I then examine if the weather shock affects investor attention by using a direct measure
of attention, the Search Volume Index (SVI) which is based on the intensity of queries on
Google search (see also Da et al., 2011; Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012). Due to the quality
and availability of SVIs for all 31 market index queries, I only conduct panel regression
3The IPSOS Global Primary Consumer Sentiment Index (PCSI) is available for 16 countries(see http://im.
thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/ipsos-primary-consumer-sentiment-index/), however,
it is a monthly indicator which may not be able to timely capture the weather effect in their index. The AAII
indicator measures sentiment though a weekly survey of individual investors with respect to their bullish,
bearish, or neutral on the stock market over the next six months (see Brown and Cliff, 2004).
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analysis for 13 out of 31 countries.4 Specifically, I investigate market-wide attention on the
basis of SVIs for queries related to different index names. For example, I use the SVI of
query for “S&P 500” in order to measure the market attention for US. Raw daily SVIs are
logarithmically transformed and deseasonalised using dummies for each month of the year.
I then examine the relationship between investor attention and weather by regressing the
SVIs on weather variables. The results in Table 3.12 clearly suggest that the temperature
has negative effect on SVIs, which is to say that attention decreases with the increase of the
temperature. I find that all three weather variables rain, snow and cloud have no significant
impact on investor attention for the panel of 13 cities.
Table 3.12 Fixed-effects panel regression analysis of the weather effect on Google SVI
SVI SVI
TEMPt -0.0018*** TEMPt-1 -0.0017***
(-4.7710) (-4.5176)
RAINt -0.0005 RAINt-1 0.0022
(-0.1000) (0.4218)
SNOWt -0.0015 SNOWt-1 -0.0026
(-0.5706) (-0.9284)
CLOUDt 0.0014 CLOUDt-1 0.0001
(1.4045) (0.12085)
Constant 0.1793*** Constant 0.1791***
(101.8661) (101.7529)
Observations 29047 Observations 29047
Adjusted R2 0.210071 Adjusted R2 0.210271
In general, the weather condition is found to have no significant impact on investor
sentiment for US whilst investor attention is only negatively related to temperature.
3.4.2.4 Economic significance: A weather-based volatility trading strategy for US
Considering that the US market attracts a large number of international traders, I am motivated
to investigate if the average weather condition in G7 countries is linked to trading volume
4The 13 cities include Bangkok, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Johannesburg, London, Madrid, Paris,
Singapore, New York, Sydney, Tokyo, and Toronto.
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Table 3.13 Impact of G7 weather on trading volume for US
S&P 500 S&P 500
G7 RAINt 0.2541*** G7 RAINt-1 0.2682***
(5.5362) (6.0114)
G7 CLOUDt -0.0331*** G7 CLOUDt-1 -0.0312***
(-4.5207) (-4.1605)
G7 SNOWt 0.0129 G7 SNOWt-1 0.0096
(0.4206) (0.3144)
G7 TEMPt 0.0075** G7 TEMPt-1 0.0076**
(2.1092) (2.1220)
Constant 0.0005 Constant 0.0007
(0.0298) (0.0391)
in the US market. So I construct a G7 weather index by taking the average weather values
of seven countries. I take the weather value of a country at t if it shares the same time
zone as New York (Toronto), and take the weather value of a country at t− 1 if the time
zone is ahead of time in New York. The impact of G7 countries weather condition on the
US trading volume is presented in Table 3.13. Both G7 rain and temperature significantly
increase S&P 500 trading volume on the day and the following day while cloud reduces
volume significantly.
Based on the collective weather effect from G7 weather conditions on US trading volumes,
I seek to explore the economic implications of these results. Table 3.13 shows that more rain
and less cloud increase trading volume of S&P 500 significantly; even though temperature
also has a positive effect on trading volume, I consider that the marginal profit from trading
on temperature may not cover the transaction cost, therefore, my trading signal is based on
rain and sky cloud cover.
VIX futures contracts are used as underlying assets for trading volatility. For VIX futures
a cost of $1.2 is assumed per contract side (estimate from CBOE for April 2013). Trading
signals are constructed on the basis of rain fall volume from excessive rain. First, I calculate
weekly means from the previous year; then I subtract the weekly mean from each daily value,
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so that I establish a benchmark for excessive rainfall. If the current value is above the value
for the previous year, then I take a long position. I take the raw data of G7 rain index as the
basis of the trading signal. Hypothetically, I invest $1 dollar at the beginning of the year
and trade through the whole year based on volumes of rainfall and cloud cover. By using
the simple long and short trading strategy, I can profit from the weather in 9 out of 10 years,
except for 2007, result shown in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14 Annualised return from VIX futures trading strategy
Year
Buy&Hold Short/Long
Annualised Return Annualised Return Sharpe
2004 -36.50% 134.19% 4.01
2005 -7.84% 77.11% 2.66
2006 -0.34% 120.09% 2.97
2007 88.24% 18.95% 0.36
2008 81.76% 111.76% 1.83
2009 -45.36% 145.33% 2.75
2010 -12.23% 72.83% 1.50
2011 37.62% 253.97% 3.97
2012 -30.95% 92.10% 1.58
2013 -17.22% 141.18% 2.20
The cumulative return from the trading strategy is depicted in Figure 3.2.
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Fig. 3.2 The value of $1 invested from 2004-2013
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3.5 Conclusions
Psychological evidence claims that rainy days yield higher productivity by reducing potential
outdoor distractions. In this study, I examine the relationship between weather conditions
and trading volumes for 33 stock exchanges from 2000 to 2013. I find that precipitation and
temperature are positively related to trading volume while snow has a negative effect. This
weather-volume relationship is also found to be nonlinear. When physical elements such as
rain interact with thermal sensation such as temperature, the decision condition changes, so
does the trading activity. In conclusion, investors are more productive during the rainy days
as the outdoor distractions are eliminated. However, in line with previous research I find that
snow causes inconvenience for the investors to attend work and this results in a decreased
trading volume. When the rainfall reaches a disruptive point, it also reduces work efficiency.
The trading volume increases with the heat as the environment becomes more comfortable
and less disruptive so that the productivity is enhanced. But at the higher heat level, trading
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volume starts to increase at a descending rate as the weather condition becomes a distraction
for leisure and outdoor activities so that the productivity is weakened.
The main practical implication of my findings is a simple trading strategy based on the
volume pattern in the US market with respect to the average weather in G7 countries. I use
VIX future contracts as underlying assets for trading volatility and take long or short position
based on adverse weather conditions from 2004 to 2013. After I take out of transaction costs,
I benefit in nine out of ten years in my sample compared to a simple buy & hold strategy. If
the hypothesized $1 dollar was invested, the value at the end of 2013 investment would be
$298.

Chapter 4
Hot information in high demand:
mergers and acquisitions announcements
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to further investigate the relationship between investor
attention/sentiment and trading behaviour/asset prices at the firm level. While in the previous
two chapters, I examined the effects of sets of events that are not directly related to stock
markets (Olympic Games and weather conditions), here I focus on events initiated by firms.
In particular, I study how investor attention and information demand changes around Merger
and Acquisition (M&A) announcements. I am also interested in how these changes are
affected by firm characteristics and whether they can explain post-announcement returns.
My framework is related to two strands in the financial literature. The first strand
studies the concept of attention allocation to firm-specific and market-wide news. Rational
attention allocation is considered as a pre-requisite for seeking financial information related
to corporate events. In particular, investor attention can affect equilibrium trading volume
and asset pricing (Sicherman et al., 2014). The second strand develops around the hypothesis
that while the management of a firm is primarily rational, markets and investors may not be
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fully rational (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). In this case, managers learn from the markets
and make strategic announcements which serve their objectives. On the other hand, investors’
reaction to these announcement may be driven by sentiment. This chapter aims to extend both
literatures by separating the role of investor attention from that of sentiment to the reaction to
M&A deals announcements. In this context, I again use the Google Search Volume Indices
(SVIs) to quantify investor’s attention and demand for information and investigate how these
vary around M&A announcements as well as whether they affect post-announcement returns.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, I provide strong evidence of the exis-
tence of an information-dependent utility at the level of the individual investor. In particular,
I show that information demand significantly decreases before the actual announcement
date while it significantly increases on the first two days after the announcement. This is
because uncertainty resolves as the announcement approaches and this reduces demand
for information. However, the announcement corresponds to a new information shock and
generates new demand for information. Second, I find that information demand is typically
lower for larger firms which are usually more transparent and are associated with higher
information supply. Third, I offer an additional way to explain the abnormal returns around
M&A announcements as I show that information demand has a positive and significant im-
pact on the acquiror’s post-announcement returns. Equivalently, the quicker the uncertainty
about the deal is resolved, the lower post-announcement returns will be. This result is robust
after controlling for a proxy of the market sentiment. As such, it supports the view that
the market reaction to M&As is primarily driven by rational factors rather than sentiment
and is consistent with the literature which studies the rational allocation of attention and its
connection to the price discovery process.
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4.2 Literature review and hypothesis formulation
In the M&A literature, empirical evidence shows that acquirors’ cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) around the announcement date are close to zero or negative (Jensen and Ruback,
1983). On the contrary, target firm’s shareholders earn significantly positive excess returns.
For example, Andrade et al. (2001) show that in a sample of 3,688 mergers between 1973
and 1998, target firms gain 23.8% in the window beginning 20 days before the acquisition
announcement and ending on the announcement day. Acquiring firms lose 3.8% over the
same interval, and the combined value change is statistically insignificant. A set of firm
characteristics and the form of payment appear to play an important role in the underperfor-
mance of M&As from the acquirors’ perspective. Indicatively, Rau and Vermaelen (1998)
find that acquirors earn a statistically and significantly negative 4% return relative to size
and book-to-market benchmarks in the first three years after the merger. Similar findings
are also documented by Agrawal and Jaffe (2000). Moeller et al. (2004) analyse a large
sample of more than 10,000 deals and find evidence of a size effect: on average, acquirors’
CARs are positive and significant (around 1.5%) but, the larger the deal, the smaller (or more
negative) the CAR becomes. Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that the average
announcement effect for the acquiring firm is -29 basis points with the reaction to cash bids
being significantly positive and the reaction to stock bids being significantly negative.
Several arguments have been proposed in the literature to explain the market reaction
to M&As with the most popular explanation being the managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll,
1986) and the synergy hypothesis (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).1 On one hand, the hubris
hypothesis argues that managers may engage in acquisitions to satisfy their personal aims.
Rosen (2006) argues that shareholders could disengage themselves from this value-destroying
behaviour, however, on the other hand, the synergy hypothesis, prominently represented by
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), argues that the M&A activities could be the result of industrial
1See Harford (2005); Andrade et al. (2001) for more details on the behavioural theory and the neoclassical
theory in mergers and acquisitions.
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and technological shocks. Similar studies draw on the theory of rational expectations and
market efficiency under which stock prices reflect the discounted value of future profits, and
adjust rapidly to reflect new public information. In this context, the reaction of the merging
entities and their competitors at the announcement of a deal can serve as a proxy for the
expected future profits from the transaction. If a merger is expected to create value, merging
companies’ stock prices should increase, otherwise they should fall.
Despite the enormous effort made in the literature to decipher the market response to
M&A announcements, the investors’ trading behaviour and their decision-making process
in connection with mergers performance have received little attention. An important issue
that remains unresolved is the extent to which investors react rationally around M&A
announcements. In this context, recent literature suggests that price changes to a corporate
announcement can be affected by investor sentiment (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rosen,
2006). For example, M&A abnormal returns could result from investors becoming pessimistic
(optimistic) with regard to mergers performance during periods of economic downturn
(upturn). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop a model which explains that the reason for
the documented size effect and payment effect in acquisitions is that the market absorbs
investors’ rational expectations as well as their sentiments. Moreover, Rau and Vermaelen
(1998) study long-term performance of the acquiring firms after the M&A announcements
and find that low book-to-market firms underperform high book-to-market firms. This is
because low book-to-market firms are considered as “glamour” stocks, and they are more
likely to strengthen the management and investors’ belief in future performance and returns
(Lakonishok et al., 1994).
On the other hand, investors attention allocation and learning capacity affect their con-
sumption behaviour and price dynamics. Peng (2005) studies the learning process of a
representative investor with a capacity (or attention) constraint and finds that investors pre-
empt in the firm’s information disclosure and smooth out the responses of stock prices. This
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effect is particularly strong for large firms since more attention allocated to larger firms
lead to less announcement surprises. Hou (2007) shows that slow information diffusion is a
leading cause of the lead-lag effect in stock returns, and limited attention associated learning
capacity may be the reason for the delayed information incorporation. Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) test the impact of the attention constraints on the predictability of stock returns and
find that stock prices do not instantaneously incorporate financial news due to information
processing constraints. These lagged trading patterns are considered to be exploitable, which
leads to monthly alphas of over 150 basis points by a long-short equity strategy.
In this chapter, I differentiate from the aforementioned literature and examine, under the
learning capacity constraint, a rational perspective of the behaviour of investors around deal
announcements. I particularly focus on the concepts of attention allocation and information
demand around M&A deals. My motivation stems from the empirical evidence which
suggests that new information is incorporated into prices before the announcement dates
due to anticipation and speculation. In this context, I expect information demand to fall
as the M&A announcement date approaches and to increase on the date in response to
the information shock generated from the announcement. However, as existing evidence
uses indirect information proxies of investor attention which are usually based on stock
prices, volatility and volume (Augustin et al., 2014), it is still unclear when the investors pay
attention to public information and how they react to new information about M&As. My
analyses help resolve this issue by directly testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis I. Information demand increases on the event date in response to the corre-
sponding information shock. In contrast, information demand decreases when the announce-
ment date is approaching as the uncertainty about the deal is resolved.
As, high M/B firms are believed to reflect overconfidence amongst investors, so I can use
the M/B ratio as a proxy of the sentiment when testing the above hypothesis. In that way, I
am able to isolate the effect of sentiment from investor attention.
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In spite of aforementioned compelling evidence concerning the learning constraint on
asset prices, its impact on acquiring firms’ returns to M&A announcement has not been
studied. In the context of M&A literature, Lambrecht (2004) studies the timing of acquisition
under the assumption that investors have complete information. The results suggest that
increased uncertainty leads to an increased investment threshold, which causes a higher
execution cost resulting in a higher output price, therefore, the cumulative returns increase
accordingly. Conversely, more uncertainty resolved leads to a less surprising announcement,
and a lower expected price, subsequently, I expect a decrease in cumulative returns. Looking
from a relaxed information environment, when facing learning capacity constraint,Andrei
and Hasler (2015) find that improvement of uncertainty implies an increase in fundamental
and current consumption because future consumption is expected to be larger, and investors
wish to smooth consumption over time. Hence the demand for the stock decreases, implying
a drop in the price.
Therefore, if Hypothesis I holds, I can assume that reduced search volume implies
an improved uncertainty in price valuation, vice versa. Considering the attention and
information constraint, investors consume time to process and incorporate new information
into their decisions (Peng, 2005), stock prices that incorporate the disclosure shock will
exhibit a delay in reflecting re-assessed fundamental value due to learning capacity constraints.
Moreover, the empirical evidence by Hou (2007) also suggests that slow incorporation of new
information cause lead-lag effects on stock returns. Subsequently, in the second stage of my
empirical analysis I investigate the explanatory power of abnormal information demand in
connection with the M&A abnormal returns. The flattened abnormal search volume suggests
more resolved uncertainties, so that the surprise element is weakened by publicly-available
information. Even though there is still an increase in fundamental value, the improved
uncertainty and investors’ smoothing consumption behaviour are constitute to a drop in price
and negative returns as results. Thereby, my second hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
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Hypothesis II. Abnormal information demand before the M&A announcement dates is
positively related to post-announcement abnormal returns.
4.3 Data description
4.3.1 Sample description
I obtain daily Google Search Volume (SVI) for the S&P 500 constituents for the years 2006 to
2014. I follow Drake et al. (2012) and use S&P 500 firms because these firms are among the
largest in the U.S. economy, and as such, they are more likely to have search data available
from Google at a daily level. Following Vlastakis and Markellos (2012), I identify a S&P
500 stock by using its company name. There are two reasons for using the company name
rather than its ticker name as recommended by Da et al. (2011). First, some ticker names,
such as “T”,“CAT” cannot be accurately identified as a particular company; second, I want to
capture a more generalised demand for information that goes beyond financial information.
For example, investors may be interested in company products, operation efficiency, company
history, etc., and it is possible that these information demands are also incorporated into their
investment decisions. I further find that 42 of the S&P 500 firms have no values of SVIs for
the entire sample period. As such, I excluded these firms from my sample.
I focus on the firms that have M&As announced between 2006 and 2014, as reported in
Thomson Reuters Eikon. I narrow the M&A deals by using four criteria: 1) all the acquiring
firms are in the S&P 500; 2) the status of both targets and acquirors is public firms; 3) the
transaction value is at least $1 million; 4) both participants in the M&A are not financial firms
because their high leverage ratios distort my operating performance measures. An additional
reason is that financial firms are closely regulated, which may constrain their ability to invest
and to manipulate accruals. I also exclude utility firms as these firms operate under special
regulations.
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In order to perform my event study, I assume that the date of the announcement of an
M&A deal is the event day. The event window that I consider in my analysis starts two
(five) days prior to the announcement date and ends two (five) days after announcement
([-2,+2],[-5,+5]). I choose this five-day and ten-day windows around the announcement by
following Fuller et al. (2002) and Drake et al. (2012). I have also used a three-day window,
as in Bouwman et al. (2009), and the results are qualitatively similar.
4.3.2 Information demand: abnormal Google Search Volume
To understand the variability of the investors’ information demand around the announcement
of an M&A deal, I employ abnormal Google SVIs (ASVI). These are calculated for firm
i on day t as the raw SVI for the same day of the week k minus the average raw SVI in
the prior 10 weeks. I consider this definition in order to remove the influence of potential
day-of-the-week effects, as search volume is considerably lower on weekends than it is on
weekdays. Following Da et al. (2011), I use the natural logarithm of 1+ASVI to normalise
the distribution of ASVI (ASVI’). Also, in order to make cross-sectional comparisons, I
investigate whether abnormal search volume around event dates varies with specific firm
characteristics (i.e. size and M/B). This interest is motivated by the existing literature which
suggests that size and sentiment affect acquiring firms’ announcement returns as discussed
in section 4.2. I average abnormal search volumes (ASVI) over particular windows and I
append the variable name to specify the window over which the variables are measured. For
example, ASVI[-5,-1] denotes that abnormal search volume is averaged over the five-day
period ending one day before the deal announcement date. The event windows under study
are up to ten days around the deal announcement.
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4.3.3 Dependent variable: M&A abnormal returns
To build the dependent variable for my tests, I use the return to the acquiring firm as market
reaction towards announcements, which reflects the investors valuation assessment to the
announcement of a deal. In particular, my proxy for the market reaction is the short run
cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) of the acquiror’s stock around the first
public announcement. For example, the five-day event window is measured as two days prior
to the announcement until two days after the announcement.
I apply the event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997) to calculate the effect of the
deal announcement on stock prices. I use a one factor model “market model” to compute
abnormal returns. This model accounts for variation in the market and thereby eliminates a
potential bias in the returns related to changes in the market which are not directly related
to the takeover. The abnormal return on a distinct day within the event window represents
the difference between the actual stock return (ri,t) on that day and the expected returns,
calculated as:
E(ri,t) = αˆi+ βˆirm,t , (4.1)
where the security specific parameters αˆi and βˆirm,t are calculated using an estimation
window of 30 days and event window of 5 days 2. The abnormal return and the sample
cumulative abnormal announcement return can be then calculated as:
ARi,t = ri,t −E(ri,t)
ĈAR(t1, t2) =
2
∑
t=−2
ÂRi,t
(4.2)
2I use the same methodology in the case of ten-day event windows.
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4.3.4 Other variables
In addition to ASVI, I also include a set of explanatory variables to identify other firm-specific
factors that may affect investors’ information demand in order to isolate the information
demand strictly related to the M&A announcement. First, the means of payment is an
important factor known to affect abnormal return, so I use dummy variables to account for
deals financed with stock, cash or mixed. Second, I consider the total assets, as measures
of accounting performance that can be affected by both the method of payment and the
accounting method. If the acquiror chooses different accounting methods, the book value
of assets will also affect the net income. Therefore, I use the ranking of total assets as
another control variable. Third, the size of the firm is also controlled in the model. In
particular, I use the ranking of market capitalisation of acquiring firms as one control variable.
Fourth, I consider the relative size logrelsize, which captures the relative importance of
the acquisition and is defined as the logarithm of the transaction value at the time of the
acquisition announcement divided by the acquiror’s market value of equity 30 days prior to
the announcement date. Finally, the financial strength of the acquiring firm is also taken into
account, and this is expressed by the market-to-book ratio. As high book-to-market ratio is
linked to higher short-run CARs (Lang et al., 1989), it is a good proxy that controls investors
sentiment. The definition of these variables is presented in Table 4.1.
4.3.5 Descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 658 completed acquisitions announced during 2006-2014 available
from Eikon. Table 4.2 reports,the summary statistics of the deals, the summary statistics of
the abnormal return under each payment method at the announcement date and the percentage
of deals that are paid by cash, stock or mix of both. Cash payment is the dominant financing
method, which accounts for 64% of the overall payment compared with 34% of mixed
financing.
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Table 4.1 Definition of variables
Variable Description
ASVI’[.] The natural logarithm of 1+the average value of ASVI_it estimated
over windows [-2,-1], [0,+2] ; [-5,-1], [0,+5]
ASVI_it The average value of raw Google Search Volume Index (SVI) for a
given day t minus the average SVI for the same weekday over the
past 10 weeks, scaled by the average SVI for the same weekday
over the past 10 weeks
AR[0] Abnormal return estimated on the day of announcement by using
market model in Section 4.3.3.
CAR[.] The abnormal return estimated over four windows, [-5,-1], [-2,-1],
[0, +2], [0,+5]. Abnormal returns are calculated by using market
model that are described in Section 4.3.3.
M/B Market-to-book value, ratio of market value of equity to book
value of equity;
Rank of M/B Percentile ranks of market-to-book ratio, taking values between 0
and 1;
Rank of size Percentile ranks of market capitalisation, taking values between 0
and 1;
Rank of assets Percentile ranks of total assets, taking values between 0 and 1;
Logrelsize The logarithm of the transaction value at the time of the acquisition
announcement divided by the acquiror’s market value of the equity
30 days prior to the announcement date;
Cash The payment has the form of cash.
Stock The payment has the form of stock.
Mix The payment method is a mix of stock and cash or other type of
financing.
Deal size Transaction value expressed in million dollars.
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics for M&A deals
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB
Mix
AR[0] 0.0032 1.88E-05 0.2765 -0.1922 0.0372 2.0565 22.2543 3650.329
Deal size 2709.243 690 130298 10 10085.74 10.1646 120.838 134649.5
Obs. 226 (34%)
Cash
AR[0] 0.0026 0.0006 0.1494 -0.0845 0.0204 1.1737 11.9178 1491.695
Deal size 607.6247 200 18040 1 1455.463 6.9337 67.3249 75955.45
Obs. 421 (64%)
Stock
AR[0] -0.0002 0.0003 0.0482 -0.0974 0.0389 -1.3487 4.6834 4.6339
Deal size 722.0909 175 4446 5 1331.702 2.2407 6.7984 15.8175
Obs. 11 (2%)
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests de-
scribed in the next section. I find that the mean abnormal search volume two days after the
announcement (ASVI’[0,+2]) is 0.0180. As a result, the abnormal search volume is 1.3%
higher than the average information demand over the whole sample period. Also, the average
search volume over five days before the announcement (ASVI’[-5,-1]) is 1.5% greater than
average search volume over the entire sample period. With regards to the abnormal search
volume at the M&A announcement dates, the ASVI[0] is 5.9% higher than average search
volume over the whole sample period.
4.4 Empirical analysis
In this section, I set up a series of models that examine the relationship between abnormal
search volume and M&A announcement dates and examine how information demand varies
in the pre-event period, announcement date and post-event period. I also examine the extent
to which cross-sectional determinants explain variation of search volume around the event
dates. Finally, I investigate the explanatory power of changes in search volume for acquiring
firm’s abnormal returns. Collectively, my analysis aims to shed light on the investor attention
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Median Max. Min. Skewness Kurtosis
CAR[0,+5] 0.0019 0.0484 0.0005 0.2791 -0.3016 0.2106 10.2155
CAR[0,+2] 0.0034 0.0371 0.0017 0.2188 -0.1822 0.4443 10.6688
CAR[-2,-1] 0.0006 0.0200 -0.0002 0.0841 -0.0937 0.2229 6.1847
CAR[-5,-1] 0.0008 0.0339 0.0008 0.2200 -0.1529 0.4907 7.1994
ASVI’[0,+5] -0.0043 0.1710 0.0140 0.4830 -1.3666 -2.3340 15.0558
ASVI’[0,+2] 0.0180 0.1725 0.0286 0.6092 -1.3875 -2.1875 15.6613
ASVI’[-2,-1] -0.0410 0.2481 -0.0023 0.8011 -1.5150 -1.7627 10.0612
ASVI’[-5,-1] -0.0451 0.2251 -0.0019 0.7507 -1.6966 -2.4881 14.7410
Deal Size 1316.7840 6114.7540 312.0000 130298 1.0000 16.3836 321.9865
Logrelsize -4.3590 1.8657 -4.2990 2.1108 -10.8691 -0.2213 3.6423
Rank of Assets 0.4570 0.2815 0.4583 0.9902 0.0000 0.1079 1.8474
Rank of Size 0.5157 0.2916 0.5262 0.9996 0.0000 -0.0579 1.7560
Rank of M/B 0.5250 0.2937 0.5471 1.0000 0.0000 -0.1063 1.7754
Rank of deal 0.4733 0.3742 0.5000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0756 1.5729
Observations 654
This table reports summary statistics for information search volume over different event windows and control
variables. The sample consists of 654 observations for S&P 500 firms over the period from 2006 to 2014.
allocation around the M&A announcement date and could help explain the announcement
effect for acquiring firms.
4.4.1 Relationship between M&As announcements and ASVIs
Managers of a firm will consider carefully the consequences of any disclosure for the stock
price of the firm, and they will strategically make an M&A announcement. For this reason,
in the short run (five-day and ten-day event window in my study), I consider the M&A
announcement to be the main shock of news disclosure for the interested investors; thus,
observed abnormal search volumes (ASVI) can be primarily attributed to this news. Hence,
in my first model setting, I regress daily abnormal search volume on the indicator variable of
the M&A deal announcement dates and the control variables that are based on information
from financial reports and the market. I estimate the model using the full time-series of
daily Google search data for my sample of S&P 500 firms. The purpose of the estimation is
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to investigate the relationship between acquisition announcement and information demand
(attention allocation).
The first model can be written as:
ASV Ii,t = α0+α1Acquisition Announcement[.]i,t +αnControls+ εi,t , (4.3)
where:
ASV Ii,t : Google SVI on day t for firm i minus the average Google SVI for the same firm
and weekday over the previous 10 weeks, all scaled by the average Google SVI for the same
firm and weekday over the previous 10 weeks;
Acquisition Announcement[.]i,t : Dummy variable set equal to one on day t before, or
after, if firm i makes an acquisition announcement and to zero otherwise (i.e. event days[-5,-
1],[0],[+1,+5]);
Controls : A set of control variables including rank o f market-to-book ratio, rank o f assets
and rank o f size.
In model (4.3), I include acquisition announcement dates to identify the magnitude of
abnormal search volume during, before and after the M&A announcement date. My set of
control variables helps us account for the potential influence from other firm-specific factors,
including the financial strength of the acquiring firm expressed by market-to-book ratio
(M/B), the size of the company by using market capitalisation and accounting performance
by using total assets.
Table 4.4 reports the estimation results for equation (4.3). I find that abnormal search
volume in the pre-event announcement period is significantly and negatively related to the
event date, whereas during and after the announcement dates, the search volume is signifi-
cantly higher than the average search volume. The abnormal high demand of information
diminishes five days after the actual announcement. These findings support Hypothesis I that
the uncertainty resolves as we get closer to the event date, as the available information is
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being consumed and incorporated into prices before the acquisition announcement. When
the firm makes the announcement, new information shocks lead the investors to demand
more information to resolve the uncertainty in relation to the deal. Gradually, the abnormal
search volume dissolves as the information of the M&A is consumed.
Table 4.4 The abnormal information demand surrounding the acquisition announcements
abnormal search volume around announcement dates
Announcement
[-5,-1] [-2,-1] [0] [+1,+2] [+1,+5]
ASVI -0.0283*** -0.0264*** 0.0596*** 0.0164*** 0.0034
(-6.4777) (-3.7847) (7.7180) (2.6766) (0.8091)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 413,972 413,972 413,972 413,972 413972
Adjust R2 0.0666 0.0665 0.0666 0.0665 0.0665
This table reports the results of abnormal search volume surrouding the takeover announcement from equa-
tion (4.3). The dependent variable is the abnormal level of search volume (ASVI) for a firm’s name for each
day at various event windows. t-statistics are presented in brackets. The sample consists of S&P 500 firms from
2006 to 2014. Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.1. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
4.4.2 Cross-sectional differences in the timing of investor demand around
M&A announcements
In this section, I explore whether firm-specific characteristics affect the patterns of search
volume around deals announcements by examining the extent to which differences in the
cross-section of firms influence those patterns. Given the large literature which documents
that the firm characteristics could affect information demand, I investigate abnormal search
volume around M&As announcements using ranks of two popular cross-sectional attributes:
firm size and financial strength. I identify firms as being high versus low in a particular
attribute by using the highest percentile amongst whole sample firms. My model in this case
can be expressed as:
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ASV Ii,t = β0+β1Announcement[.]i,t +β2Attributei,t
+β3(Announcement[.]i,t ×Attributei,t)+βnControls,
(4.4)
where:
Announcement[.]i,t : event-day indicator variables set equal to one during the days before,
during and after (i.e. event days [-2,-1], [-5,-1],[0],[+1,+2], [+1,+5]), and zero otherwise;
Attributei,t : one of two indicators variables defined as follows:
Large f irms: indicator variable set equal to one if the market value of the firm is in the
highest 10% of the sample and to zero otherwise;
Glamour f irms: indicator variable set equal to one if the financial strength of the firm is
in the highest 10% of the sample and to zero otherwise;
Controls: a set of control variables including rank o f deal size, rank o f assets and
rank o f market-to-book ratio.
Table 4.5 reports the estimation results of firm size effects for equation (4.4). Even
though my results are consistent with the previous section, I find that the size of the firm
has a negative effect on the abnormal search volume. My interpretation is that the cost of
acquiring information for large firms is relatively low given that large firms’ information is
more accessible and transparent compared to small firms. This result is also confirmed when
I replace the large firm dummy to the small firm dummy (lowest 10% of market value). In
this case, the signs of the interaction between small firms and announcement date are positive
before and during the announcement, suggesting that investors demand more information
for small firms.3 This finding is supported by the existing literature which reports that
return premiums for small firms are higher than large firms to compensate the information
3The results are reported in Table C.2 in the Appendix
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Table 4.5 The impact of firms size on the timing of information demand around M&A
announcement
Daily Abnormal Search Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Large firms -0.0015 -0.0016* -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0015
(-1.4615) (-1.6741) (-1.4315) (-1.4888) (-1.4781)
Announcement[-5,-1] -0.0295***
(-6.0494)
[-5,-1]*large firms 0.0068
(0.6227)
Announcement[-2,-1] -0.0327***
(-4.1918)
[-2,-1]*large firms 0.0321*
(1.8615)
Announcement[0] 0.0379***
(3.1132)
[0]*large firms -0.0497**
(-2.5430)
Announcement[+1,+2] 0.0208***
(3.0667)
[+1,+2]*large firms -0.0231
(-1.4568)
Announcement[+1,+5] 0.0054
(1.1545)
[+1,+5]*large firms -0.0095
(-0.8796)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 413,038 413,038 413,038 413,038 413,038
Adjusted R2 0.0666 0.0665 0.0665 0.0665 0.0665
This table reports the results of firm size effect from equation (4.4). The dependent variable is the abnormal
level of Google search volume for a firm i for each day t. t-statistics are presented in brackets. The sample
consists of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2014. Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.1. *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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acquisition costs (Moeller et al., 2004). However, these results are not significant in several
cases. This is because my sample only includes S&P 500 firms, which are generally large.
I next investigate the relationship between information demand and investor sentiment
(proxied by the M/B ratio). Specifically, I examine if investors demand more information for
glamour firms (high M/B ratio) than value firms (low M/B ratio) 4. According to Shleifer
and Vishny (2003), high M/B firms are overvalued by the market and investor sentiment
may be the reason for the misvaluation. The empirical evidence also suggests that around
the announcement of the acquisition, glamour bidders experience higher abnormal returns
than value bidders (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Therefore, around an M&A announcement
for a glamour firm, if the investors are driven by sentiment, the information demand for
glamour and value firms will be significantly different. In other words, by looking at the
impact of glamour firms on the abnormal search volume, I am able to examine if bullish
sentiment attracts more attention and demand of information from investors. To this end, I
have repeated the tests from equation (4.4) and report the following results:
Table 4.6 reports the estimation results for potential sentiment effect. I find that abnormal
search volume around announcement dates shows the same pattern as in first section. The
pre-announcement search is negatively related to announcement dates whereas the search
volume increases during and after actual announcement. However, the interaction term is
not significant in this estimation. Overall, the results give further evidence in support of
Hypothesis I: the information demand change around the announcement date is driven by the
uncertainty of the value of the deal rather than sentiment.
4Barber and Odean (2008) point out that investors may limit their search to stocks meeting specific criteria
that attract their attention.
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Table 4.6 The impact of firms value status on the timing of information demand around M&A
announcement
Daily Abnormal Search Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Glamour firms -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005
(-0.2628) (-0.4148) (-0.4835) (-0.4146) (-0.4815)
Announcement[-5,-1] -0.0245***
(-5.2965)
[-5,-1]*glamour firms -0.0353**
(-2.5001)
Announcement[-2,-1] -0.0240***
(-3.2697)
[-2,-1]*glamour firms -0.0217
(-0.9506)
Announcement[0] 0.0282**
(2.3403)
[0]*glamour firms 0.0081
(0.3273)
Announcement[+1,+2] 0.0184***
(2.8472)
[+1,+2]*glamour firms -0.0190
(-0.9468)
Announcement[+1,+5] 0.0032
(0.7036)
[+1,+5]*glamour firms 0.0033
(0.2410)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 413,038 413,038 413,038 413,038 413,038
Adjusted R2 0.0666 0.0665 0.0665 0.0665 0.0665
This table reports the results of the impact of firm value status on the timing of abnormal search volume from
equation (4.4). The dependent variable is the abnormal level of Google search volume for a firm i for each day
t. t-statistics are presented in brackets. The sample consists of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2014. Variable
definitions are provided in Table 4.1. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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4.4.3 The impact of abnormal search volume on the market response
to M&A announcements
In this section, I examine whether abnormal search volume can explain announcement
abnormal returns. My main hypothesis is that abnormal pre-announcement search have a
positive relation to post-announcement abnormal returns. To investigate whether abnormal
information demand is associated with the price discovery of M&A announcement, I perform
my analysis on four event windows: [-2,-1], [0,2]; [-5,-1], and [0,+5]. I test whether
the relationship between pre-announcement abnormal search volumes and the subsequent
abnormal returns is stronger when pre-announcement search volume is relatively higher.
Specifically, I estimate the following model:
CAR[.] = γ0+ γ1ASV I′[.]+ γ2Deal attributes+ γ3(Deal attributes × ASV I′[.])
+ γnControls+ ε
(4.5)
Where,
CAR[.] = the abnormal return over various event windows; e.g. CAR[-5,-1] denotes
the abnormal return starts five days before the announcement and end one day before the
announcement;
ASVI’[.] = The natural logarithm of 1+the average value of ASV Ii,t estimated over
various windows; e.g. ASVI’[-5,-1] denotes the normalised abnormal search volume starts
five days before the announcement and ends one day before the announcement;
Deal attributes = payment methods including cash, stock and mix; logrelsize;
Controls = a set of control variables, including rank o f size, rank o f market-to-book ratio
and rank o f assets.
Table 4.7 reports the estimation results for equation (4.5). The two panels respectively
report the impact of deal characteristics on abnormal returns during two event windows
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[-2,-1] and [-5,-1]. The heading of each column denotes the abnormal return by different
payment methods and deal size. In columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) from the upper half of the
table, I report the results using the normalised abnormal search volume for the event window
[-2,-1] (ASVI’[-2,-1]) as the variable of interest; and in the lower half of the table, I present
the results for the event window [-5,-1] (ASVI’[-5,-1). I also include the control variables
and the interactions of the abnormal search volume with the deal properties in all regressions.
In Table 4.7, column (1), I find that the coefficient for ASVI’[-2,-1] is positively and
significantly related to the cumulative abnormal return at [0,+2]. The interaction term of
the abnormal search volume with the deal relative size is also positive and significant in
connection to post-announcement abnormal return. These results suggest that, when investors
search for more information for large deals in the period prior to the announcement, the
search volume information is translated into new information and incorporated into price
changes with a delay. In column (3), I find the results for cash payment are similar to (1).
On the other hand, as the results in column (2) indicate, the interaction of the abnormal
search volume with the stock as payment method is not significantly related to the abnormal
return, even though the lead-lag abnormal return effect still holds and payment in the form of
stock leads to a negative abnormal return. This indicates that investors are not particularly
interested in searching for more information when the stock is used for payment. Insignificant
but positive coefficient for the interaction is lastly observed for the case for mixed payment
of cash and stock as shown in column (4). Finally, when the event window is extended to
[-5,-1], the coefficients of the interactions are insignificant.
Overall, the results support Hypothesis II, suggesting that pre-announcement abnormal
search volume is associated with post-announcement abnormal returns. As I have controlled
for investor sentiment using the M/B ratio, my results suggest that investor attention is a
strong driver of negative CARs after the announcement. This is in line with information-
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dependent utility hypothesis, suggesting that pre-empted information is used to resolve
valuation uncertainty and price discovery.
I also repeat the above analysis for different event windows to examine whether lagged
abnormal search volume is associated with abnormal returns at [0,+5]. The results are
reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C and are qualitatively similar to the case CAR[0,+2], but
less significant, as the effect of information demand changes dissipates with time.
4.4.4 Alternative explanations
When I interpret the results, I am also aware that the underlying psychology of information
demand and trading decisions conditional on information is very different. For example,
abnormal search volume may be associated with a realisation utility burst as gains and losses
are almost certain or interact with fluctuations in investor confidence (Daniel et al., 1998;
Gervais and Odean, 2001; Peng and Xiong, 2006), while paying attention (and mentally
focusing) may reinforce their sentiment driven utility burst. In this study, I do not separate
their motives of demanding information surrounding the event dates. On the contrary, I
investigate the outcome of abnormal information demand and its impact on the price discovery
of the announcement shock.
The another noticeable factor in M&A announcement is the anticipation effect that affects
investors’ searching behaviour for information. Billett and Qian (2008) find that the market
anticipates future acquisition deals based on CEO acquisition targets and earn abnormal
returns because of the increased probability that they will be targets themselves. In my study,
the anticipation effect is not controlled in the model so that I cannot rule out that the increased
abnormal information demand is the result of a complete shock; otherwise it could also be
the consequence of predicted acquisition.
4.4 Empirical analysis 95
Table 4.7 The relationship between abnormal returns, deal size, payment method and abnor-
mal search
CAR[0,+2]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ASVI’[-2,-1] 0.0006∗∗ 0.0101 0.0391∗ 0.0113
(2.3146) (0.7834) (1.8220) (0.6057)
ASVI’[-2,-1]*Logrelsize 0.0002∗∗
(2.5143)
Logrelsize 0.0055∗∗
(2.4327)
ASVI’[-2,-1]*Stock −0.1120
(1.2826)
Stock −0.1390∗∗∗
(−4.7817)
ASVI’[-2,-1]*Cash 0.0004∗∗∗
(3.3846)
Cash 0.0098
(0.2196)
ASVI’[-2,-1]*mix 0.0144
(0.4860)
Mix 0.0025
(0.3301)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 654 654 654 654
Adjusted R2 0.3561 0.3572 0.3893 0.3236
ASVI’[-5,-1] 0.0716∗∗ 0.0224 0.0571∗∗ 0.0206
(2.1208) (1.5439) (2.0140) (1.1583)
ASVI’[-5,-1]*Logrelsize 0.0099
(1.3653)
Logrelsize 0.0047∗∗
(2.2697)
ASVI’[-5,-1]*Stock −0.0965
(−1.3041)
Stock −0.1441∗∗∗
(−4.7761)
ASVI’[-5,-1]*Cash −0.0371
(−1.1104)
Cash 0.0099
(1.2336)
ASVI’[-5,-1]*Mix 0.0195
(0.5352)
Mix 0.0028
(0.3603)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 655 655 655 655
Adjusted R2 0.3036 0.3035 0.3098 0.3084
This table reports the results of relationship between the abnormal return, abnormal search volume and deal
characteristics from equation (4.5). The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return at period [0,+2].
t-statistics are presented in brackets. The sample consists of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2014. Variable
definitions are provided in Table 4.1. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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4.5 Conclusions
By using Google search volume as a proxy for information demand and attention allocation,
I set up a series of models that investigate the relationship between the timing of investors
information demand and M&A announcement, and the extent to which investor demand for
information. First, I investigate the relationship between abnormal search volume and M&A
announcement dates and examine how information demand varies in the pre-event period,
announcement date and post-event period. Next, I examine the extent to which cross-sectional
determinants explain variation of search volume around the event dates. I also investigate
the explanatory power of changes in search volume in acquiring firms’ abnormal returns.
Collectively, these analyses shed light on investors attention allocation for information in
order to resolve price valuation uncertainties surrounding the M&A announcement date and
provide more understanding in explaining the announcement effect for acquiring firms.
I provide empirical evidence on the nature and timing of investor information demand
surrounding corporate event announcement dates. I find that the acquiring firms’ price
changes are in relation to the abnormal search volume before the actual announcement dates.
Overall, my findings are summarised as follows: first, I find that investor information demand
increases significantly when it is at the announcement date and the abnormal high demand
diminishes two days after the announcement date. Second, I find that the pre-announcement
abnormal search volume decreases for large firms, where the acquiror’s information is more
accessible and the information cost to resolve more uncertainties is low. Third, my results
show that abnormal search volume prior to the announcement contains useful information
and is translated into price discovery in a delay after the actual announcement dates. In
general, I conclude that pre-announcement abnormal search volume is useful to explain the
post-announcement price changes of the acquiring firms; and this positive relationship can
be partially explained by relative deal size and payment method.
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In this study, I am not able to distinguish the impact between large firms and small firms
on the abnormal search volume because my entire sample is S&P 500 firms, which makes
the firm size difference negligible. In future research, I could include more random public
firms in order to examine whether firm size affects abnormal search volume. Moreover, I
could also extend my study to the target firms by looking at acquiring firms and target firms
simultaneously; then, I could understand better how investors make use of information and
whether abnormal search volume is also related to target firm characteristics.

Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Conclusions of the thesis
This thesis investigates the role of investor attention and sentiment in the financial markets
by performing three empirical studies. First, it examines the impact of significant sports
events on stock performance at the market and firm level in order to distinguish the market
effects of inattention from those of sentiment. Second, it studies the influence of weather on
investor attention and sentiment and how this translates to changes on investor trading activity
and stock market performance. Finally, it examines how investors allocate their attention
around the announcement of mergers and acquisitions and how their attention before the
announcements affects post-announcement stock prices.
In particular, Chapter 2 analyses how sentiment and attention are related to investment
behaviour by investigating the market effects of the Summer Olympic Games for eight
participating countries and five sponsoring firms. In this context, I employ a new dataset of
daily medals awarded over the Olympic Games. I find that medals negatively affect both
volatility and trading volumes in a statistically and economically significant manner. For
example, US trading volume (realised volatility) during Olympics is more than 24% (61%)
lower than comparable periods in years when Games do not take place. Each gold medal
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leads to a further decrease in volume of nearly 3% on average over the trading day following
the award. I extend my analysis to determine whether this result can be explained on the
basis of investor attention or sports sentiment. To this end, I document that medals have a
positive relationship with a direct measure of investor inattention for all sample countries. In
contrast, my analysis shows that there are no significant links between Olympics and investor
sentiment as this is measured by five different indicators. Overall, I conclude that Olympic
Games affect the attention of investors but not their mood.
In Chapter 3, I study the connection between weather conditions and stock market activity
for 31 stock exchanges in the period of 2000-2013. My hypothesis is that rainy days can
enhance investor attention to market trading by making the outdoor leisure activities less
appealing. I empirically confirm that rain and temperature positively affect trading activity,
and the weather-volume relationship is nonlinear. I also find that particularly bad weather
conditions, such as snow, reduce trading volume as they generate inconvenience to investors
and other market participants. These results are robust to fixed effects and asymmetries.
Finally, I show that the documented relationship between weather and volatility can be used
to create a profitable trading strategy which employs volatility futures.
In Chapter 4, I use Google searches as a proxy for information demand and attention
allocation in order to investigate how investor information demand changes around M&A
announcements. I find that investor information demand significantly increases before the
announcement date and falls two days after the announcement date. Abnormal search
volume is smaller for large firms, where the acquiror’s information is more accessible and
the information cost to resolve potential uncertainties is low. Finally I show that post-
announcement acquiring firms’ price changes are positively related to the abnormal search
volume before the actual announcement dates. As such, abnormal information search volume
prior to the announcement contains useful information of the price changes of the acquiring
firms. This connection can be partially explained by the relative deal size and payment
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method. My results in this chapter evince that post-acquisition returns can be partially
explained by rational attention allocation.
Overall, this thesis extends the literature in the fields of investor attention and sentiment in
several important ways. First, it highlights the importance of the joint treatment of attention
and sentiment in the context of addressing trading patterns in the financial markets. Second,
it shows that specific patterns of investor behaviour that are typically examined in the context
of sentiment can be rationally explained through the concept of investor attention. Third,
it shows that investor attention and sentiment results in stock market patterns that can be
exploited by specific trading strategies. I expect that the thesis will generate a new strand in
the literature that will examine the effect of investor attention on market patterns which, up
to now, have been considered to stem from investor sentiment changes.
5.2 Limitations and future research
I now discuss the limitations of my analyses in each chapter of this thesis which could
be resolved by future research. Starting with Chapter 2, one limitation is that I estimate
distraction by adding up all the medals from the previous working day during the Olympic
Games period. However, the eight countries typically receive more than one medal during the
day. In this sense, I assume that every medal carries the same weight of distraction, hence, the
sum of the medals over the previous workday may be over-extrapolated (under-) as a measure
of distraction. Also, I assume that the medals from the previous workday is a distraction
for next day’s trading performance, whereas this inattention may last for more than one day.
Finally, in future research, I could use alternative measures of investor attention, such as
account logon activity during the event period.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the impact of weather on investors trading behaviour by
including four weather variables as regressors. However, in this study, I do not consider
the interactions between the weather variables, except for heat. This could be achieved in
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future research. Also, I do not fully account for the fact that investors in the region may not
participate in their local stock markets. This is especially relevant for mature markets, where
many investors are international players. Although I take home bias into consideration, it is
possible that the observed pattern of behaviour change is under-represented.
In Chapter 4, investor sentiment is proxied by the acquiring firms market-to-book ratio.
This assumes that the misvaluation of the stock price is the projection of investor sentiment.
However, a large market-to-book ratio could simply be that fundamental price changes fall
outside of the company’s accounting period when the new information is not recorded. In
this sense, my results of information demand for glamour firms are subject to the choice of
accounting periods and methods. Another limitation in this chapter is that I use firms from
the S&P 500 index that are typically large market capitalisation firms. Future research could
extend my analysis to smaller firms. Finally, I could investigate the role of the information
demand for target firms in M&As.
Appendix A
Is there an Olympic gold medal rush in
the stock market?
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Table A.3 Impact of Olympic medals on the returns at market and firm level
Market Gold Med Silver Bronze Popular
US -0.0002* -5.71E-05 -0.0001 -9.46E-05 -6.63E-05
(-1.8486) (-1.3834) (-1.4369) (-0.5864) (-0.9089)
UK 0.0003 0.0001** 0.0009 -5.32E-05 0.0010*
(1.3812) (2.1575) (0.1806) (-0.1917) (1.9137)
FRA 0.0016*** 0.0006*** 0.0009 0.0015*** 0.0025***
(2.6510) (2.9330) (1.3822) (3.9204) (4.7558)
AUS 0.0001 5.63E-05 0.0003 -3.11E-05 -0.0004
(0.2343) (0.3221) (0.6708) (-0.0604) (-0.6996)
NLD 0.0008 0.0007* 0.0019*** 0.0012 5.33E-05
(0.7294) (1.6947) (3.0003) (0.9951) (0.1093)
GER 0.0004 0.0003** 0.0008 0.0009*** 0.0007
(0.7295) (2.3577) (1.4913) (4.0761) (1.1883)
KOR -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0050***
(-0.6922) (-0.6643) (-0.3869) (-0.6785) (2.9557)
JPN 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0005
(0.1262) (1.5240) (0.3455) (3.3061) (1.5895)
MSCI -2.60E-05 -1.11E-05 -5.19E-05 -1.93E-05 -7.92E-06
(-0.3265) (-0.4412) (-0.6766) (-0.2886) (-0.1202)
TUS -1.18E-04 -4.38E-05 -1.43E-04 -1.25E-04 -7.63E-05
(-1.1870) (-1.4264) (-1.6574) (-1.4441) (-0.9292)
Firms TGold TMed TSilver TBronze TPopular
KO 1.76E-04 7.67E-05 3.14E-04 1.69E-04 2.31E-04
(0.8522) (0.9224) (1.0798) (0.6790) (0.9439)
MCD -2.03E-04 -5.91E-05 -1.64E-04 -1.44E-04 -1.70E-05
(-1.4720) (-1.0944) (-0.9613) (-0.8365) (-0.0580)
PC 1.25E-04 5.56E-05 2.18E-04 1.35E-04 -7.90E-06
(0.4182) (0.5638) (0.7875) (0.4719) (-0.0301)
VIS 1.76E-04 4.84E-05 4.10E-05 1.88E-04 3.53E-06
(1.4028) (1.0566) (0.2579) (1.5630) (0.0195)
SAM 4.40E-05 2.19E-05 9.83E-05 4.59E-05 1.95E-04
(0.3339) (0.4602) (0.6941) (0.3048) (1.3494)
The table gives the value of the coefficients bi1 in regression (2.2) with return as the dependent variable
in regression (2.1). Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. When TUS is used, which is the total number of medals for
all eight countries, the returns correspond to U.S.
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Table A.4 Impact of surprise-weighted Olympic medals on returns, volume, realised volatility
(RV) and implied volatility (IV)
Market Return Volume RV IV
US 0.0036 -0.3430 2.05E-05 -1.29E-04**
(0.5864) (-1.1319) (0.1630) (-2.0831)
UK -0.0028 -0.2729 -2.1E-05 -7.19E-05
(-0.4793) (-0.7538) (-0.5106) (-0.9984)
FRA 0.0068 -1.1991** -0.0001 -2.37E-04***
(0.3287) (-2.1905) (-0.8351) (-2.7249)
AUS 0.0137 0.1830 0.0005*** 4.44E-04**
(1.5174) (0.2072) (3.9368) (2.3269)
NLD 0.0050 -1.7609** -0.0005*** -8.83E-04**
(0.2318) (-2.3369) (-2.6505) (2.0963)
GER 0.0215 -1.3864*** -0.0003** -2.66E-04**
(0.9239) (-3.0436) (-2.0876) (-2.0670)
KOR -0.0799 -1.9971** -4.9E-05 -7.49E-05
(-1.5646) (-2.2443) (-0.5787) (-0.5378)
JPN 0.0139 -1.5170 -0.0001 -5.12E-04
(0.6374) (-0.9733) (-0.6697) (-1.4141)
Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively.
108 Is there an Olympic gold medal rush in the stock market?
Table A.5 Contemporaneous impact of Olympic medals on investor attention measured by
Google SVI
Market Med Gold Silver Bronze Popular Surprise
US -0.0283** -0.0652** -0.0681** -0.0896*** -0.0336** -1.5239**
(-2.4954) (-2.3965) (-2.1881) (-2.8154) (-2.3911) (-2.0223)
UK -0.0920*** -0.1799*** -0.2236*** -0.1857*** -0.2678*** -0.2722
(-5.3560) (-6.3929) (-4.3220) (-3.9488) (-2.6022) (-0.3349)
FRA 0.0094 -0.0151 0.0499 0.0034 0.0236 0.0155
(0.0767) (-0.0443) (0.2842) (0.0153) (0.0997) (0.0052)
AUS -0.0648*** -0.1486*** -0.1128*** -0.1528*** -0.0855*** 1.6990*
(-4.5461) (-5.4215) (-3.066) (-4.1620) (-2.9657) (2.0371)
NLD -0.0699*** -0.1442* -0.1416*** -0.0580* -0.1959** 1.1646
(-3.3886) (-1.8796) (-3.2822) (-1.8575) (-2.2605) (1.0271)
GER -0.0246* -0.0394 -0.0436 -0.0724* -0.0428 -1.3331***
(-1.6719) (-1.0463) (-1.3651) (-1.8760) (-0.9746) (-4.9106)
JPN -0.0917 -0.0670 -0.2304* -0.2041** -0.1279 0.4726
(-1.3947) (-0.6284) (-1.8218) (-2.2516) (-1.2806) (0.2232)
Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively.
Appendix B
Do investors save trading for a rainy
day?
Table B.1 Quantile regression analysis of the weather effect on trading volume for individual
market
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
AMS 0.0015 -0.0787 0.0194*** 0.0072 -0.4208***
(0.8818) (-1.8155) -17.0665 (1.4803) (-48.5319)
ATH 0.0109* 4.7990*** 0.0423*** -0.9873***
(2.4899) (14.7853) (3.6290) (-50.4698)
BAI -0.0078 -0.0493 -0.0014 -0.6187***
(-1.8732) (-1.3026) (-0.1717) (-31.7829)
BKK -0.0006 0.0163 -0.0549** -0.6334***
(-0.0593) (0.3563) (-3.2444) (-33.0664)
BRU -0.0012 0.0137 -0.0398*** -0.0031 -0.5448***
(-0.5490) (0.1727) (-8.4457) (-0.3446) (-43.6233)
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
COP 0.0058 -0.0217 0.0032 -0.0160 -0.5309***
(1.6917) (-0.2114) (1.0041) (-1.7316) (-35.0764)
DJ 0.0002 0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0007 -0.3282***
(0.2446) (0.8168) (-1.8911) (-0.2875) (-56.4050)
DUB 0.0055 -0.0293 -0.0050 0.0032 -0.6968***
(1.7215) (-0.3145) (-1.3468) (0.2471) (-45.0592)
FRK 0.0000 -0.0145 -0.0300 0.0036 -0.4417***
(0.0178) (-0.5136) (-1.0900) (0.6209) (-48.6404)
HEL 0.0042* 0.1029 0.0023 -0.0073 -0.5379***
(2.5224) (1.6591) (0.9910) (-0.9626) (-47.7359)
HKG 0.0030 0.0125 0.0073 -0.5964***
(1.2130) (0.6494) (0.9127) (-52.9793)
IST 0.0012 0.0433 0.0207** -0.0022 -0.4058***
(0.4160) (0.4975) (3.2328) (-0.2914) (-31.3669)
JOH 0.0017 -0.0126 -0.0059 -0.4243***
(0.5720) (-0.1756) (-0.5656) (-31.0755)
KLU 0.0178** -0.0037 0.1361** -0.5726***
(2.7019) (-0.1889) (2.7543) (-44.3619)
LDN 0.0036 -0.0661 0.0521** 0.0809*** -0.7540***
(1.8633) (-1.6662) (2.8194) (14.4818) (-77.0032)
MAD 0.0004 0.0946 -0.0125* -0.5773***
(0.1609) (1.2221) (-2.0833) (-52.5868)
MIL 0.0030 0.0581*** -0.0076 -0.4533***
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
(1.1686) (3.8162) (-1.3854) (-38.2256)
MNL 0.0204 0.0201 0.0290* -0.5855***
(1.9526) (0.9887) (2.1414) (-35.4282)
NQ 0.0030* -0.0011 -0.0195** -0.0009 -0.3462***
(2.4506) (-0.0566) (-2.9754) (-0.2888) (-46.4044)
OSL -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0274*** 0.0172* -0.8531***
(-0.1592) (0.0082) (-7.9818) (2.0576) (-59.5619)
PAR -0.0002 0.0087 -0.0258 -0.0062 -0.4180***
(-0.1120) (0.1350) (-0.6319) (-1.1859) (-47.1072)
SEO 0.0018 0.0113 0.0206 -0.0030 -0.4726***
(1.1290) (0.8368) (1.0257) (-0.8873) (-53.3720)
SIN 0.0258** 0.0429 0.0007 -0.3637***
(3.2084) (1.8525) (0.0213) (-23.9046)
SP 0.0038 -0.0295 -0.0203 0.0032 -0.5329***
(1.9511) (-0.8107) (-1.7736) (0.5932) (-46.0221)
SPL -0.0094** 0.0233 -0.0029 -0.4944***
(-2.8255) (0.8343) (-0.3980) (-37.1507)
STG -0.0125** 0.0606 -0.0154* -0.5192***
(-3.2948) (0.5578) (-2.4770) (-34.5882)
STK 0.0016 -18.1373 0.0019 -0.4401***
(0.8221) (-1.6368) (0.2796) (-36.7904)
SYD 0.0020 0.0197 0.0761 -0.0030 -0.4357***
(0.8589) (0.6302) (1.4229) (-0.5839) (-46.6793)
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
TKY 0.0041 0.0282 0.0103* -0.5512***
(1.7032) (1.3176) (2.0500) (-51.7069)
TPI -0.0017 0.0199 -0.0104 -0.4624***
(-0.6078) (1.1143) (-1.6064) (-42.1023)
TRT 0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0228*** -0.0033 -0.4292***
(0.5296) (-0.0461) (-3.3522) (-0.7931) (-39.9447)
VIE -0.0044* -0.0132 0.0031 -0.0270** -0.9698***
(-1.9711) (-0.1626) (0.3368) (-2.8014) (-63.8798)
ZUR 0.0008 -0.0405 0.0114 -0.0029 -0.4821***
(0.4597) (-0.9961) (0.8970) (-0.4561) (-52.2538)
This table gives the value of the quantile regression at bottom 10% with deseasonalised and detrended trading
volume as the dependent variable and deseaonslised weather as independent variables, respectively. ***,**,*
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Table B.2 Quantile regression analysis of the weather effect on trading volume for individual
market
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
AMS 0.0075* 0.2271* 0.0056 -0.0209* 0.5278***
(2.2638) (2.3205) (1.8966) (-2.3670) (28.6813)
ATH 0.0023 1.8819 -0.0322** 1.0354***
(0.6138) (1.5513) (-3.0718) (53.2512)
BAI -0.0056 0.0062 0.0089 0.6483***
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – continued from previous page
TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
(-1.3147) (0.1391) (1.2502) (37.1926)
BKK -0.0056 -0.0139 -0.0749*** 0.6531***
(-0.7891) (-0.4803) (-4.9709) (40.1927)
BRU -0.0022 0.0902* -0.0128** -0.0139 0.5988***
(-0.9541) (2.1622) (-3.2447) (-1.5681) (43.7320)
COP 0.0085** 0.1310 -0.0060*** -0.0044 0.5841***
(3.0826) (1.0392) (-3.3937) (-0.4705) (41.7898)
DJ 0.0014 0.0101 -0.0242*** -0.0014 0.3498***
(0.9127) (0.3897) (-3.7953) (-0.3548) (39.2807)
DUB 0.0230*** 0.2424 -0.0075** -0.0212 0.8170***
(5.5089) (1.8662) (-3.0439) (-1.4431) (39.8664)
FRK 0.0022 0.0787* -0.0894** 0.0107 0.6229***
(0.8770) (2.1542) (-2.8709) (1.1004) (39.0270)
HEL -0.0016 -0.0273 -0.0255*** 0.0063 0.6470***
(-0.6601) (-0.2634) (-7.1952) (0.5478) (36.7813)
HKG -0.0153** -0.0265 0.0125 0.7212***
(-2.6017) (-0.6835) (0.8267) (30.2437)
IST -0.0000 0.0130 -0.0017 0.0124* 0.4141***
(-0.0217) (0.1699) (-0.3601) (2.1089) (41.4537)
JOH -0.0027 0.0548 -0.0018 0.4910***
(-1.0980) (0.9435) (-0.2341) (45.2304)
KLU -0.0892*** -0.0648* -0.2030* 0.6674***
(-8.7857) (-2.1895) (-2.5239) (36.9749)
Continued on next page
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TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
LDN 0.0023 0.2383*** -0.0036 -0.0039 0.7558***
(1.5067) (8.5871) (-0.4440) (-0.9905) (96.4803)
MAD -0.0063* 0.1665 -0.0081 0.6427***
(-2.4433) (1.6112) (-1.0590) (48.8021)
MIL 0.0002 0.0541** -0.0180** 0.5163***
(0.0549) (3.2291) (-2.7620) (36.3401)
MNL -0.0004 -0.0670 -0.0243* 0.6533***
(-0.0367) (-1.5312) (-2.1137) (39.7008)
NQ 0.0072*** 0.0129 -0.0321*** -0.0061 0.3950***
(3.4335) (0.3295) (-3.7103) (-1.0928) (30.0988)
OSL 0.0100*** -0.0164 0.0055* 0.0050 0.9089***
(5.5236) (-0.2973) (2.0134) (0.5925) (64.0625)
PAR -0.0032 0.1213 -0.2045** 0.0023 0.5135***
(-1.3431) (1.1807) (-2.6774) (0.2790) (37.5291)
SEO 0.0003 -0.0205 -0.0111 0.0009 0.4742***
(0.1502) (-0.8564) (-0.6341) (0.1729) (40.7606)
SIN 0.0116 -0.0157 -0.0009 0.3707***
(1.2167) (-0.5882) (-0.0272) (23.2813)
SP -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0098* -0.0057 0.5208***
(-0.2829) (-0.0506) (-2.0299) (-1.7998) (69.3288)
SPL -0.0096** 0.0541* -0.0155* 0.5108***
(-3.2766) (2.0674) (-2.2855) (39.3363)
STG -0.0104* -0.0502 0.0008 0.5436***
Continued on next page
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TEMP RAIN SNOW CLOUD Constant
(-2.0180) (-0.3804) (0.1090) (30.7418)
STK 0.0029 -
111.4706***
0.0057 0.5145***
(1.7337) (-14.6431) (0.9707) (46.6373)
SYD 0.0045 -0.0400 -0.7298*** 0.0110 0.4757***
(1.8383) (-1.1544) (-9.9898) (1.8692) (48.0144)
TKY 0.0013 -0.0178 -0.0061 0.6690***
(0.4663) (-0.8082) (-1.0083) (59.1435)
TPI -0.0057* -0.0102 -0.0074 0.4634***
(-2.1805) (-0.5689) (-1.0505) (43.1982)
TRT -0.0022 -0.0028 0.0049 -0.0077* 0.4773***
(-1.5065) (-0.0615) (0.8082) (-2.1694) (48.0309)
VIE 0.0058** 0.1090 -0.0183 -0.0284*** 1.0992***
(2.7821) (1.4218) (-1.1414) (-3.3873) (83.4696)
ZUR -0.0012 0.2257*** -0.0465 -0.0249* 0.6188***
(-0.3769) (3.6368) (-1.1827) (-2.0252) (34.5259)
This table gives the value of the quantile regression at top 10% with deseasonalised and detrended trading
volume as the dependent variable and deseaonslised weather as independent variables, respectively. ***,**,*
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.1 The relationship between lagged abnormal return and abnormal search volume
during various event window
CAR[0,+5] CAR[0,+5]
ASVI’[-5,-1] 0.0774 ASVI[-2,-1] 0.0454
(1.4219) (0.9834)
ASVI’[-5,-1] *Logrelsize 0.0111 ASVI[-2,-1]*Logrelsize 0.0013
(0.9547) (0.1041)
Logrelsize 0.0097*** Logrelsize 0.0097***
(2.6730) (2.6857)
ASVI’[-5,-1] 0.0189 ASVI[-2,-1] 0.0236
(0.7515) (1.0805)
ASVI’[-5,-1]*Stock -0.2401* ASVI[-2,-1]*Stock -0.2669*
(-1.8859) (-1.8002)
Stock -0.1925*** Stock -0.1795***
(-3.6864) (3.6094)
ASVI’[-5,-1] 0.0301 ASVI[-2,-1] 0.0214
(0.6422) (0.6046)
ASVI’[-5,-1]*Cash -0.0134 ASVI[-2,-1]*Cash 0.0088
(-0.2405) (0.1857)
Cash 0.0145 Cash 0.0150
(1.1454) (1.2060)
Control Yes Control Yes
Observation 655 Observation 654
This table
reports the results of cumulative abnormal returns at different event windows from equation (4.5). The dependent
variable is the abnormal level of Google searh volume for a firm’s name for each day. t-statistics are presented
in brackets. The sample consists of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2014. Variable definitions are provided in
Table 4.1. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table C.2 The impact of small firms on the timing of information demand around M&A
announcement
Daily Abnormal Search Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Small firms 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008
(0.5577) (0.6121) (0.6161) (0.6898) (0.7127)
Announcement[-5,-1] -0.0285***
(-6.3732)
[-5,-1]*Small firms 0.0056
(0.2696)
Announcement[-2,-1] -0.0265***
(-3.7156)
[-2,-1]*Small firms 0.0048
(0.1448)
Announcement[0] 0.0269**
(2.2707)
[0]*Small firms 0.0443
(1.1805)
Announcement[+1,+2] 0.0174***
(2.7754)
[+1,+2]*Small firms -0.0219
(-0.7027)
Announcement[+1,+5] 0.0046
(1.0619)
[+1,+5]*Small firms -0.0245
(-1.1833)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 413,038 413,038 413,038 413,038 413,038
Adjusted R2 0.0666 0.0665 0.0665 0.0665 0.0665
This table reports the results of firm size effect of small firms from equation (4.4). The dependent variable is the
abnormal level of Google searh volume for a firm’s name for each day. t-statistics are presented in brackets.
The sample consists of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2014. Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.1.
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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